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BREAKING THE GLASS SLIPPER -
REFLECTIONS ON THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX
Patricia E. Dilley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers and their staffs, in drafting tax legislation, often resemble Prince
Charming looking for Cinderella with that glass slipper in hand-rather than
start from scratch and draft a completely new tax provision. It is frequently
easier, faster, and more reassuring to taxpayers and tax practitioners to use an
existing statute or approach and simply amend it slightly to make it fit the need
of the new provision. However, problems can arise from this approach.
In the original Grimm Brothers' version of the Cinderella story, for example,
the wicked stepsisters were each so anxious to be the chosen one that they
mutilated their feet to make the Prince's glass slipper fit.' In a similar fashion,
existing tax laws designed to serve one purpose are occasionally bent to the
breaking point to serve quite different ones, or are used as the model for tax
provisions intended to satisfy other needs. The payroll tax-FICA or Social
Security tax 2-is an example of a tax model that may have been stretched
beyond all recognition in the quite different context of self-employment. The
central theme of this essay is that the shoe, in fact, may not fit at all, requiring
some thinking about a different approach to a payroll tax equivalent for the self-
employed.
The FICA tax is the neglected stepchild of tax policy analysis. Of little inter-
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Frederic G. Levin College of Law; Swarthmore
College, B.A., 1973; University of Pennsylvania, M.A., 1976; Georgetown University Law School,
J.D., 1986; Boston University, LL.M., 1993. My thanks to Cecily Rock of the Joint Committee on
Taxation staff for some illuminating conversations about SECA tax issues (although the faults of this
essay are in no way attributable to anyone but myself). Thanks to my research assistants Karla Hyatt,
Katherine Molnar, Josh Richardson and Leslie Thomson, and to the University of Florida College of
Law for summer grant support.
'Each stepsister in turn cut off part of her foot to force it into the glass slipper, and it was the
resulting trail of blood (plus some talkative sparrows) that gave her away to the rather unobservant
Prince. See THE COMPLETE GRIMM'S FAIRY TALES, THE PANTHEON FAIRY TALE AND FOLKLORE LIBRARY
121, 127 (1944, 1972).
2Federal Insurance Contributions Act, I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128. This tax finances the three social
insurance programs that most people think of as Social Security: the Old Age and Survivors'
Insurance (OASI) program, which provides cash benefits to retired workers and their families, and to
surviving dependents of deceased workers, Social Security Act Title II, §§ 201-234, 42 U.S.C. §§
402-434 (2000); the Disability Insurance (DI) program which provides cash benefits to disabled
workers and their families; Social Security Act Title II, § 223, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2000); and the
Health Insurance (HI) program popularly known as Medicare - the HI tax finances Part A of
Medicare, the hospital reimbursement part of the program. Social Security Act Title XVI, §§ 1601,
1602, 1611-21,42 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1802, 1811-21 (2000). Part B of Medicare, the physician reim-
bursement program, is funded through premiums paid partly by Medicare beneficiaries and partly
through general Federal government revenues. Social Security Act Title XVI §§ 1631-1634, 42
U.S.C. 1831-34 (2000).
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est to theorists because of its relatively simple structure,3 and unpopular with tax
policy analysts because of its regressivity,4 the FICA tax has received little
attention in the tax literature, except to the extent it is implicated in the operation
of its massively complex offspring, the earned income tax credit.' The corollary
of the FICA tax for the self-employed, the SECA tax,6 has been until recently an
even more neglected element of the U.S. tax system. Of late, however, it appears
that Cinderella has finally arrived at the ball, at least as far as practitioners, small
business owners, and members of Congress are concerned, as agitation over the
SECA tax and its application in a variety of settings has grown exponentially
since the early 1990s.7 In fact, after forty years of shy obscurity in the corner,
the self-employment tax over the last decade has become the life of the party,
primarily because of changes both in the rate of application of the SECA tax
itself, and in the way businesses have begun to organize themselves.
The central problem of the self-employment tax, however, has not changed:
3The total FICA tax rate is currently 7.65 percent, a rate reached in 1990 as a result of the last in a
series of increases in the tax rate enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1977. The
OASDI portion of the total rate is 6.2 percent, applied to all wages up to a "contribution and benefit
base," equal for 2000 to $76,400, an amount which is indexed and increased each year according to
the increase in average wages in the U.S. economy. Social Security Act Title 11, § 230, 42 U.S.C. §
430 (2000). The remaining 1.45 percent is allocated to the HI program, and is applied to all wages
with no limit, although up until 1993, the wage limit was the same for both the OASDI and HI
portions of the tax. See discussion infra Part III.E (discussing the impact of this change on the level
of concern with FICA and SECA taxes on the part of practitioners and their clients).4See, e.g., JOSEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 232-233 et seq (1987) ("The payroll taxes that are
used to finance [Social Security] programs are used to finance these programs are regressive. In the
long run, most of the payroll taxes are probably paid by the worker; it makes no difference whether
the law imposes the tax on the employee or on the employer. The existing payroll taxes and the
increases in tax rates already scheduled will have a major effect on the distribution of tax burdens.
The equity of these taxes would be increased by improvement of the earned-income tax credit,
introduction of personal exemptions and a standard deduction into the payroll tax and removal of the
maximum taxable-earnings ceiling, integration of the payroll and income taxes, or use of the general
fund for financing future social security benefits.").
I See generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (1995); see also George K. Yin, et al., Improving the
Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit
Program, II AM. J. TAX POL. 225 (1994). The earned income tax credit (EITC) was formulated in
the 1970's generally to offset the regressive impact of the payroll tax, by giving a credit to low-
income workers that effectively repays them for the FICA taxes they (but not their employers) have
paid during the taxable year.
The self-employment tax is imposed under the Self Employment Contributions Act (SECA).
I.R.C. §§ 1401-1403. The SECA tax is imposed on self-employment income, which is defined in §
1402(b) as net earnings from self-employment (NESE). The same wage base limitations applicable
to wages of employees are applicable to NESE. The income on which the SECA tax is assessed is
recorded by the Social Security Administration as the earnings record on which Social Security
benefits are based. Thus, eventual eligibility for Social Security retirement, survivors' and disability
benefits, as well as Medicare benefits, generally requires ten years of net earnings from self-employ-
ment on which SECA taxes have been paid.
7See, e.g., Stuart Levine & Marshall B. Paul, Partnerships, S Corporations, & LLCs, Prop. Regs.
Use 'Management Rights' Litmus Test for LLC Members' SE Tax Liability, 82 J. TAX'N 196 (1995);
Steven G. Frost, 'Square Peg, Meet Round Hole:' Classifying LLC Members as 'General Partners'
or 'Limited Partners'for Federal Tax Purposes, TAXES Dec. 1995, at 676.
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how do we impose a wage tax when there is no employer-employee relationship
to signify that wages as such are being paid? In point of fact, the SECA tax is
not really a wage tax at all, but rather is a kind of income tax, on that part of the
self-employed person's income that looks most like wages.' However, to para-
phrase Gertrude Stein, income is income is income.' Earnings or wages cannot
be distinguished from any other type of income except by the circumstances of
receipt. The tax system frequently functions based on presumptions and circum-
stantial evidence that indicate the existence of one type of income or another,
rather in the way astronomers detect black holes in space by noting the absence
of other stars around them. For example, capital gains exist only in the context
of a sale or exchange, ° just as compensation for services is presumed to exist
(in the absence of other evidence to the contrary) whenever value passes from
employer to employee. I
This article sets out certain clusters of issues arising from the difficulty of
applying the wage tax concept in the world of the undifferentiated income re-
ceived outside the context of wage or salaried employment. It is my suspicion
that the ultimate solution for perceived difficulties in identifying the appropriate
SECA tax base, or the appropriate SECA taxpayers, may lie in the larger context
of the Social Security payroll tax concept generally. The problem may not be so
much deciding how to apply a tax to wages as it is whether to apply such a tax at
all.
This article first examines the legislative development of the SECA tax, in the
context of both tax and social welfare policy, as part of the post-World War II
expansion of coverage and benefits under Social Security. The relationship be-
tween the taxing mechanism and the benefit system it finances has usually been
neglected in discussions of the problems of the SECA tax. It is helpful, however,
to understand how and why various groups were eventually covered under the
system in order to think constructively about how the complex statutory struc-
ture of the current law might be revised. In addition, the development of the
SECA tax rules applicable to pass-through taxable entities (partnerships, S cor-
porations, and LLCs, as well as closely-held corporations in some circumstances)
needs to be clarified in some detail, as most of the current controversies con-
cerning the payroll tax have arisen in connection particularly with LLCs. 12
The next part of the essay is devoted to discussion of several points of focus
in the general area of issues connected to the SECA tax, providing an examina-
tion of the issues from several different perspectives. It begins with the inherent
'See discussion supra note 6.
9GERTRUDE STEIN, SACRED EMILY (1913) ("Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.").
"'Section 1221 defines the term "capital asset"; capital gain or loss arises, under section 1222,
"from the sale or exchange of a capital asset."
"See, e.g., Alves v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that transferring stock
from corporation to executive was compensatory transfer despite executive's payment of fair market
value for stock).
"
2See Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough Entities And The Self-Employment Tax: Is It Time For A
Uniform Standard?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 811 (1998).
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functional conflicts within the SECA tax structure that arise in two areas: first,
the use of a type of income tax to perform the functions of a wage tax; and
second, the use of that tax structure both to collect revenue and to accrue
benefits under Social Security for individual workers. Each of these conflicting
objectives contributes to the complexity of the task of identifying self-employed
workers and self-employment earnings.
Next, there is the problem of identifying the appropriate tax base to which the
SECA tax should be applied, including both the current law structure, and two
alternate approaches that can be taken. On one hand, it is possible to use an
exclusionary approach, under which all income of the self-employed person
would be excluded from the definition of "net earnings from self-employment"
to which the SECA tax is applied except for that which can be clearly identified
as earnings from the performance of services or the labor of the individual.
Alternatively, an inclusionary approach would include all income of the self-
employed person except that which can be clearly identified as income derived
from capital (dividends or income analogous in character to dividends in a non-
corporate context.) While the nominal distinction between these approaches is
simply one of threshold presumptions, the substantive and procedural differ-
ences are significant and raise different problems.
Third, there is the issue of properly identifying the self-employed person. For
example, how can one properly distinguish independent contractors from em-
ployees, 3 or LLC members whose distributions of income are on account of
labor or services rendered, from members whose distributions are in the nature
of a dividend, constituting simply passive earnings on a capital investment? The
latter distinction is linked to the previous issue of identifying the tax base, but
somewhat different questions also are involved, related in particular to the ben-
efit accrual function of the tax. Throughout these issues, the problem of separat-
ing wage income from all other types of income is the persistent unifying theme.
The current response to this problem is to impose a sort of fictional employer-
employee relationship on a single individual working independently. The fol-
lowing discussion may illustrate some of the dangers of this kind of legislating
by analogy-that is, of imposing an artificial duality, drawn from the FICA tax
model, on a single taxpayer.
After discussing each of these areas of concern, this article offers several
modest suggestions concerning fruitful avenues of exploration for solutions to
some of the most strident complaints about the SECA tax. As long as both
benefit accrual and revenue collection are required SECA functions, any im-
provement is likely to be minimal. However, to the extent that the major SECA
tax issues can be traced back to the elimination of the Medicare wage base, some
"
3See Nationwide Mutual his. Co. v Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (adopting 20-factor common law
tests for determining who qualifies as an employee); see also Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying common law test of employee even where employer and employee
signed contracts stating the latter was not employee but was independent contractor).
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proposals that do not involve changes in SECA itself might nonetheless resolve
some SECA tax (as well as other) problems.
II. HOW DID WE GET HERE? BRIEF BACKGROUND
Before discussing the issues specific to the SECA tax and the current debate,
some background on the Social Security system generally will be helpful. The
difficulties inherent in applying the SECA tax to the appropriate measure of
income and on the correct taxpayer all flow from the historic insistence on
financing social insurance programs with a wage tax rather than an income tax.
Some understanding of the historic development of both Social Security and the
payroll tax system is a necessary (although frequently ignored) precondition to
understanding why the wage tax is still viewed by many as a critical element of
the current Social Security program.
A. Basic Benefit and Financing Structure
The Social Security system funded by employment taxes consists of three
programs, as described above: retirement and survivors, disability, and health
benefits.'4 Eligibility for benefits under all of these programs is established
through work in employment covered by Social Security. However, from the
perspective of their financing and payment system structures, these programs
can be viewed as falling into two categories: the cash benefit programs (retire-
ment, survivors', and disability), the amount of whose payments are tied directly
to an earnings record; 5 and the health programs (Medicare Parts A and B),
whose payments are tied to the cost of medical care without reference to the
beneficiary's earnings record once initial eligibility for benefits is established.
The cash benefit retirement program was the original benefit provided under
Social Security; survivors' benefits were added as part of the first major amend-
ments to the Social Security Act in 1939, and the disability program was enacted
in 1956. 6 The health insurance programs, in contrast, were not enacted until
1964, and as part of the compromises necessary for enactment, were based on a
reimbursement system involving private insurers and imposing no real limits on
4See discussion supra note 2.
"As a result of work in covered employment, workers establish an earnings record on which their
retirement, disability, and survivor's cash benefits are based. For both cash benefits and Medicare, a
minimal period of employment, or earnings, covered by Social Security, is required: for basic
eligibility for retirement benefits and Medicare, a worker generally must have at least 40 quarters (10
years) of earnings covered by Social Security to qualify for benefits. The exact number of quarters
required varies with the worker's age, but all workers are fully insured for life once they have 40
quarters of coverage. For survivors' benefits, an additional currently insured status (earnings in 6 of
the 13 calendar quarters preceding the worker's death) is required; for disability benefits, earnings in
20 of the 40 quarters preceding disability is generally required. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 402, 413, 414 (2000). For the cash programs, the amount of benefits is generally a percentage of
prior earnings, although the benefit formula is weighted to provide a higher level of replacement of
prior earnings for low earners. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 215 (2000).
6Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat 807.
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the amounts of billings to be paid to physicians. 7
While Social Security benefits are not based on taxes paid, but rather on
earnings recorded through the tax withholding system, there is nonetheless a
direct link between the benefit and the financing systems in the cash benefit
programs: benefits, as well as taxes paid, are based only on earnings up to the
taxable wage base. 8 In contrast, hospital and physician bills paid under Medi-
care are not tied to the worker's past earnings record, but rather are limited by a
complex system of reimbursement designed to limit doctor and hospital costs.' 9
Because of the direct reimbursement character of the Medicare health payment
system (as opposed to, for example, a system based on some form of cash
voucher that could be used to pay medical bills), the nature of Medicare benefits
cannot be expressed as a reflection of the beneficiary's earnings record in the
way that cash benefits can. The only direct connection, therefore, between the
Medicare benefit and revenue systems is the recording of earnings function of
the payroll tax to the extent of establishing initial eligibility for benefits (in most
cases ten years or forty quarters of covered employment).2"
B. Expansion of Social Security Coverage to the Self-Employed
The entire structure of Social Security-benefits and supporting taxes-is
centered on the employer-employee relationship, a mirror of the overall U.S.
private and public social welfare benefit system, which provides retirement and
health benefits overwhelmingly through wage-based programs.2' Originally, how-
ever, coverage under Social Security did not extend even to all wage-earning
workers; when established in 1935 as a system principally of retirement benefits
for industrial workers, Social Security originally covered only a fraction of the
"
7See EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, MR. SOCIAL SECURITY: THE LIFE OF WILBUR J. COHEN 212 et seq
(1995) (recalling the political struggles over the passage of Medicare from the perspective of one of
the chief architects of Social Security and Medicare). Current limits on the payment system were
inaugurated as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601-07, 97
Stat. 67, 149-72.
'I.R.C. § 3121(a)(]); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2)(A) (2000).
"
5Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i, 1395t (2000).
2 Workers generally acquire fully insured status, the minimum requirement for initial eligibility
for benefits under Social Security's cash and non-cash benefit programs. Under § 414(a) of the
Social Security Act, an individual will be fully insured if she has at least forty quarters of coverage.
A quarter of coverage is defined in § 413 as the amount of wages paid to an employee or credited
self-employment income for a self-employed person necessary to earn a quarter of coverage - this
amount was set in 1977 as $250, indexed to increases in average total covered wages. For the year
2000, $780 in wages paid or net earning from self-employment (NESE) credited is required to
receive one quarter of coverage - up to four quarters of coverage per calendar year may be earned.
Thus, workers born in 1929 or later are fully insured for both Medicare and Social Security retire-
ment benefits once they have worked in covered employment for ten years. Additional years of work
in covered employment generally result in higher cash benefits in the retirement and disability
programs, since benefits are based on a percentage of lifetime average earnings, but no additional
benefit will accrue under the Medicare program.
2 See generally EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits (4th ed. 1997).
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nation's work force.22 Up until 1951, no self-employed workers were covered
under Social Security and therefore were not subject to the FICA tax. This
limited coverage was the result of both practical political limitations on the
reach of the original program, as well as a philosophical framework that to some
extent tempered the overarching principle of universal coverage with the notion
of covering only those who seemed to most need pension protection.
One important practical consideration in the insistence on payroll tax financ-
ing to begin with was that few Americans paid any income taxes in the 1930s, or
indeed until World War II and the post-war years.23 Social Security's designers
insisted on a contributory system, in which all those earning benefits would
provide evidence of their work record, and would be given a personal link to the
program through direct payment of a wage tax dedicated solely to financing
Social Security benefits. 4 The payroll tax collected through the withholding
mechanism was devised both as a means of financing benefits and as a symbolic
link between covered workers and the retirement program. The wage tax was
relatively easy to implement and enforce, given that wages were essentially
defined by being exchanged in an employer-employee setting.
The principle of universal, compulsory coverage was an essential element of
Social Security from the beginning, at least in the minds of its designers.25
However, the original 1935 legislation covered only workers in industrial wage
labor, primarily because of political concerns about proposing a broader social
insurance program that would impose difficult administrative burdens:
[T]he staff [of the Committee on Economic Security that originally drafted the
first Social Security Act] pointed out the difficulties of basing contributions on
any source of income other than wages or salaries and argued that wage earners
were in the greatest need of protection. But they went on to state that adminis-
trative difficulties suggested further limitations, at least in the early years of a
system. They suggested the exclusion of farm labor and domestic servants in
private homes, despite their great need for protection, until after administrative
experience was gained in less difficult areas of operation ... Only in respect to
the exclusion of profits, interest, or rents did the staff ... indicate any justifica-
2 2
See JILL QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS AND POLITICS IN THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 99-151 (1988); see also DORA COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT: AN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1880-1990 (1998).23See PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 63 ("For almost thirty years after its adoption in 1913, the
individual income tax applied mainly to a small number of high-income people. Exemptions were
high by today's standards, and few income were large enough to be subject to tax even at the lowest
rate, let alone the higher graduated rates.").
24See J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY (1977).251d., at 57 ("The principles that support universal coverage of all workers include the goal of
adequate protection under social insurance as the basic safeguard against poverty rather than depen-
dence upon fortuitous protection by either private savings and insurance or public needs-test assis-
tance. The principle of current-flow financing is most effective when all workers contribute to the
benefits of all workers, without some workers and their employers being excused from assuming a
mutual responsibility of citizenship."). Brown was one of the original architects of Social Security,
and was chair of the Advisory Council in 1937 and 1938 that developed the expansion of the original
1935 program into the basic old age and survivors' program in existence today.
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tion in principle. The reasons for limiting the coverage of the old-age insurance
system were those of administrative or political expediency or of federal juris-
diction. 6
This "administrative expediency" was related to the circumstantial nature of
the definition of wages, and the problem of identifying taxable wages for farm
laborers and domestic servants, who received substantial portions of their remu-
neration in the form of room and board, on which it was difficult at the time to
assess a payroll tax, given the paucity of cash resources, particularly for farmers.
Since the income tax was largely not paid at the time by people at such income
levels, the issues involving definition of such in-kind income as taxable income
had yet to be fully explored, or at least had not been explored as extensively as
they were in later cases.27
After World War II, Congress began to expand coverage under the program;
many categories of self-employed persons were covered in a series of these
expansions in 1950, 1954, and later.2" The expansion of coverage is attributable
to several factors, primarily the maturation of the retirement system and the
increasing cementation of the retirement expectation in the minds of the Ameri-
can public. 9 The order of expansion of coverage to the various groups is signifi-
cant. The coverage of farm and domestic workers occurred first in 1950, and is
consistent with the original purpose of covering only industrial workers, which
was to reach lower-income workers who were seen as needing Social Security
benefits more than higher-income professionals. 0 Then, beginning in 1954, So-
cial Security coverage began to be expanded beyond wage earners in a tradi-
tional employment relationship, reaching self-employed farm owners and self-
employed professionals except physicians and attorneys." By 1956, attorneys
were no longer able to fight off inclusion in the Social Security system, and
coverage was expanded to self-employed persons generally, except physicians,
21d., at 60-61. Given the difficulties experienced in the last 15 years of convincing both domestic
workers and their employers that FICA taxes should be paid on wages paid for in-home childcare,
this concern was prescient. See Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-387, 108 Stat. 4071 (1994).
27There was a series of cases from the early 1940s through the early 1950s that addressed the tax
consequences of in-kind compensation, but the bulk of these cases dealt with taxpayers who were
either executives or owners of the business providing the compensation. These cases by and large
did not address the treatment of in-kind income to average workers. See Saunders v. Commissioner,
215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954): Leicht v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1943): Chandler I,.
Commissioner, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941). For a classic analysis of the importance of including
non-cash compensation in the measure of taxable income, see Boris Bittker, A 'Comprehensive Tax
Base'As a Goal of hcome Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967).
"Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 401,411,412 (West 2000).2
9See WILLIAM A. GRAEBNER, A HtsToRY OF RETIREMENT (1980); see also COSTA, supra note 22, at
27 ("Since the 1950s, a much more positive view of retirement as emerged, far removed from early
reforms' conception of retirement as protection against the insecurities of an industrialized economy.
Retirement is now viewed as a period of enjoyment . . . and as a reward for a lifetime of labor,
increasingly shorter.")
"'Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64 Stat. 477, 494-95.
"'Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761,68 Stat. 1052, 1055.
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as well as to farm owners who materially participated in farm operations.32
Finally, in 1965, shortly after enactment of Medicare, medical interns and self-
employed physicians were covered.33
The struggle to cover self-employed professionals reveals both the adminis-
trative difficulties of assessing the taxes necessary to support Social Security
outside the context of an employer's payroll-difficulties which are still evident
in current SECA tax issues-and the philosophical ambivalence of the original
designers over covering highly paid independent professionals who were much
less likely to need Social Security in retirement than the originally targeted
industrial workers. Eventually, for the policymakers, the principle of universal
coverage-and universal taxation-outweighed doubts about extending the ben-
efits of the program to high-earning professionals. Yet the resistance of the early
Social Security designers to application of the payroll tax to "profits, interest, or
rents" indicates the technical difficulties inherent in identifying wage-like in-
come that should be subject to SECA.34
An additional element was the difficulty of determining when the condition of
retirement might begin for self-employed persons. Part of the change in work
patterns from the nineteenth into the twentieth century was the gradual shift of
most workers from self-employed farm or craft occupations into wage labor,
creating the opportunity and the need for formal retirement, that is, for a clear-
cut line between the end of a working life and the beginning of a period of
unemployment lasting until death.35 Self-employed persons, in contrast, particu-
larly farmers and professionals such as attorneys and physicians, were and con-
tinue to be better able to regulate their hours of work so as to blur the distinction
between work and retirement.3 6
For the professionals who resisted Social Security coverage in the 1950s,
however, it was apparently self-interest, in the form of the advantages of obtain-
ing retirement and disability coverage and benefits in exchange for paying what
was at the time still a relatively low tax rate, that induced eventual acquiescence
to coverage.3 7 Inevitably, perhaps, the current resistance to extending the reach
32Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat. 807, 825.33Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 380-81. See BROWN,
supra note 24, at 62 ("It took until 1965 to overcome the unenlightened opposition of the medical
profession....").
'See discussion supra notes 26, 27.
35See ANN SHOLA ORLOFF, THE POLITICS OF PENSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITAIN, CANADA,
AND THE UNITED STATES 1880-1940 (1993). "Self-employment serves as an important barrier against
forced retirement. Recent quantitative research has confirmed that wagework was increasing and
self-employment was declining in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States.. The
rise of wagework made all wage workers vulnerable to unemployment; for the elderly, this was often
the equivalent of unpaid, forced retirement, a possibility simply not present for elderly people who
owned land or small businesses. Farmers and small business owners were much better able than
industrial workers to retire partially...." Id., at 99.3 The continuing evolution of the nature of work can only further blur these distinctions, not just
between work and retirement, but between work and leisure at any age.
"See BROWN, supra note 24, at 62.
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of the SECA tax to members of pass-through entities previously thought im-
mune from that tax is driven to a large extent by the increase in tax rates for both
FICA and SECA, and the perceived decrease in the value of Social Security
benefits for this group.38
C. SECA Tax Rates, Credits, and Deductions
1. In General
In addition to the expansion of Social Security coverage to the self-employed,
the details of the structure of the SECA tax itself evolved over time. As de-
scribed above, the Social Security tax and benefit system is based on the prin-
ciple of equal contributions to the system from both the employer and employee;
benefits are based on earnings records that reflect wages earned, but not neces-
sarily taxes paid.3 9 When coverage under Social Security was extended to the
self-employed in 1951, however, a different tax structure was required since
there was no employer-employee wage-paying structure. Nonetheless, Congress
determined that the self-employed must be taxed on a basis comparable to that
of employers and employees-that is, "on remuneration received for one's own
labor."40
From 1951 through 1983, self-employed persons paid a rate that was approxi-
mately seventy-five percent of the combined employer-employee rate for the
OASDI portion of the FICA tax, and fifty percent of the HI portion. 4' This
percentage was intended to represent the full employee's share plus a rough
estimate of the after-tax employer's share of the tax; 42 as a result, self-employed
persons were not allowed to deduct any portion of the SECA taxes they paid
from their self-employment earnings for either income tax or SECA tax pur-
poses.43
As part of a major reform of the Social Security system and its financing in
the Social Security Amendments of 1983,' the SECA tax structure was revised
35See John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey
the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do", 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 930 (2000) (asserting that
avoidance of payroll taxes is a principal reason for choosing pass-through business entities).
39Payroll taxes are collected and paid to the government by the employer, not the employee, but if
employers fail to pay the appropriate share of FICA taxes, employees can still be credited with the
earnings credited for that period, as the Social Security Act contains no provision for denying
coverage on the grounds of non-payment of taxes. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, 411,
414 (2000).4 See S. REP. No. 81-1669 (1950). This report accompanied House Report 6000, the Social Secu-
rity Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 734, which first imposed the self-employment tax.
4
n 1951, the self-employed contribution rate was 2.25 percent when the combined employer-
employee rate was 3 percent; in 1957 the SECA rate was 3.375 percent, and the FICA combined rate
was 4.5 percent, reflecting enactment of the disability insurance program and a corresponding
increase in rates; by 1966, the SECA rate had risen to 6.15 percent, and FICA had risen to 8.4
percent, reflecting enactment of Medicare. In 1982, the SECA rate was 9.35 percent, and the
combined FICA rate was 13.4 percent.42See ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 285-87 (4th ed. 1993).
431d.
4 Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
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to require self-employed persons to pay, in effect, "both halves" of the employer
and employee shares of Social Security taxes.45 While a deduction for the "em-
ployer" share of the total rate seemed to be required for logic and parity of
treatment, concern about short-term revenue shortfalls in the program (which
were the impetus for the 1983 legislation) precluded immediate provision of a
deduction.46 As a substitute for a deduction for SECA taxes paid, a credit for a
portion of the tax, taken directly against the self-employment taxes paid, was
allowed for taxable years 1984 through 1989, and a deduction for one-half of the
self-employment tax liability was provided for 1990 and later years.
47
The SECA tax deduction48 is designed to put the self-employed worker, after
both income and SECA taxes are imposed on self-employment earnings, in
roughly the same position as an employee after income and FICA taxes are
imposed on wage income.49 This is a complex task, since the equivalent of the
FICA wage for the self-employed earner is a net figure, minus employer taxes
imposed on self-employment income (SECA taxes).50
As a result, there are two parts to the current statutory scheme." An income
45The 1977 Amendments set scheduled tax increases in 1982 to 13.4 percent, in 1985 to 14.1
percent, in 1986 to 14.3 percent, and 15.3 percent. in 1990, for a final increase. The major financing
changes made the 1983 Social Security Act Amendments include acceleration of part of the payroll
tax increases that had been enacted in 1977. As a result, part of an increase scheduled to take place
in 1985 (which would have raised the combined FICA rate from 13.4 percent to 14.1 percent) was
moved to 1984 (raising the rate in 1984 to 14 percent); similarly, the rate was scheduled to increase
from the 1986 rate of 14.5 percent to its final rate of 15.3 percent in 1990, but the 1983 legislation
inserted an interim increase from 14.5 percent to 15.02 percent in 1988. At the time of the amend-
ments, a total of $39.4 billion for the period 1983 to 1989 was estimated to be raised by accelerating
the scheduled tax increases for FICA, and $18.5 billion for the same period was estimated to be
raised by increasing SECA tax rates.
"'See John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Act Amendments of 1983: Legislative Histor
,
and Sunnary of Provisions, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, July 1983, at 27-28.
47The deduction for one-half of SECA taxes imposed under § 1401 was provided in § 164(0, also
enacted in 1983 as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, but made effective for tax years
beginning after 1989. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
The following table shows the combined impact of the SECA tax rates and credits for 1984-1990
and later:
Tax Years OASDI HI Combined Credit Effective Rate
1984 11.40% 2.60% 14% 2.70% 11.30%
1985 11.40% 2.70% 14.10% 2.30% 11.80%
1986 11.40% 2.90% 14.30% 2.00% 12.30%
1987 11.40% 2.90% 14.30% 2.00% 12.30%
1988 12.12% 2.90% 15.02% 2.00% 13.02%
1989 12.12% 2.90% 15.02% 2.00% 13.02%
1990 & later 12.40% 2.90% 15.30% 0% 15.30% (pre-deduction)
481.R.C. §§ 164(f), 1402(a)(12). Section 1402(a)(12) is part of the definition of net earnings from
self-employment under § 1402(a) generally.41H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-47, at 126 (1983).
5 See id.
51Much of the following explanation is drawn from my New York University Federal Tax Institute
outline. The Self-Employment Tax, Ch. 4, New York University's 54th Institute on Federal Taxation:
Conference on Employee Benefits & Executive Compensation (1996).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 54, No. I
SECTION OF TAXATION
tax deduction is allowed under section 164(f)52 for one-half of the self-employ-
ment tax imposed under section 1401,1 3 in recognition of the fact that employee
wages do not include the employer share of the FICA tax. In addition, under
Code section 1402(12),"4 as part of the definition of net earnings from self
employment, a reduction is allowed in the self-employment tax base equal to the
FICA tax (equivalent to one-half of the SECA tax) that would be paid on net
earnings from self-employment (before any reduction under section 164(f)),
again in recognition of the fact that employee wages do not include the em-
ployer share of the FICA tax.55
It should be noted that this Rube Goldberg structure is necessitated, at least in
part, by the SECA tax's imposition of a deemed employer-employee structure
on workers who are outside of the traditional employment relationship. In con-
trast, the more flexible income tax structure is centered on receipt of income,
from whatever source, by the individual. The borrowed FICA tax structure on
which the SECA tax is modeled requires a fictional division of the individual
into two parts-employer and employee-and then requires separation of "wage-
like" income from all other types of income. Moreover, the need to impose more
or less equal tax burdens on employees and self-employed workers puts addi-
tional pressure on the SECA tax design, resulting in the complex deduction
mechanism.
2. SECA Tax Base
While the FICA tax is assessed generally on all wages in covered employment
except for certain specifically excepted categories,56 the SECA tax is assessed
on NESE: the self-employed person's gross income derived from a trade or
business, minus allowable deductions attributable to that trade or business, plus
her distributive share of the net income or loss from a trade or business carried
on by a partnership of which she is a general partner or a limited partner receiv-
ing payments in connection with services rendered to the partnership.57
Because the SECA tax is an analog to the FICA payroll tax for employees, the
statute requires that only income "derived from a trade or business," minus
521.R.C. § 164(f).531.R.C. § 1401.54
.R.C. § 1402(12).
55The language of § 1402(12) makes clear that the definition of net earnings from self employ-
ment, which is applicable only for SECA tax purposes, does not reflect the § 164(f) income tax
deduction: "in lieu of the deduction provided by section 164(f') ... there shall be allowed a deduction
equal to the product of [half the SECA tax rate multiplied by] (A) the taxpayer's net earnings from
self-employment for the taxable year (determined without regard to this paragraph)..." (emphasis
added). The Service's instructions for Form 1040 and the long and short SE schedules correctly
reflect the statutory requirement, by requiring the taxpayer to multiply 1-.0765 or 92.35 percent
times self-employment income to arrive at net earnings from self-employment. But see Sheldon
Banoff, et al., Has IRS Erred in the SE Tax Calculations on Form 1040?, JOURNAL OF TAXATION 126,
127 (1994).
6See I.R.C. §§ 3111, 3112.
"See I.R.C. § 1402(a).
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deductions associated with that trade or business, be included in the SECA tax
base. 58 Certain functions are excluded under the statute from the definition of
trade or business for SECA purposes only; many of them parallel to the exclu-
sions under the FICA tax for certain types of work, such as some public employ-
ment, not covered under Social Security. 9 The definition of "trade or business"
is generally the same as applied for income tax purposes, in connection with
trade or business expense deductions under section 162.60 Determining whether
or not an activity constitutes a trade or business requires consideration of all the
facts and circumstances of the case.
6
'
While there is no statutory requirement for the active participation of an
individual in the trade or business from which net earnings from self-employ-
ment are derived, the regulations state that passive earnings are not subject to
SECA tax unless the trade or business is being actively carried on by an agent or
employee directly on behalf of the taxpayer. 62 Both the Service and the courts
construe the "agency" requirement somewhat broadly, particularly in the context
of a partnership, in the interests of preventing tax avoidance by partners who
may actually be generating the income in question through actual services per-
formed. This can lead to some results in which the revenue collection function
of SECA seems to overtake completely the connection with benefit accrual, as
in the case of Ethyle Moorehead who was ninety-two when the Tax Court found
that she was liable for SECA taxes on partnership income because of services
performed on her behalf by agents.
63
51ln general, amounts that are excluded from income under the income tax will not be included in
the base of income subject to SECA tax as net earnings from self-employment. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-
2(a).
59The primary exclusions for SECA tax purposes include the functions of a public office, I.R.C.
§1402(c)(I); performance as an employee as defined in § 3121(d), I.R.C. §§ 1402(c)(2) - (d);
performance as a minister or member of a religious order, I.R.C. § 1402(c)(4); performance as a
Christian Science practitioner, I.R.C. § 1402(c)(5); and performance of Services by members of
religious groups opposed on the basis of religion to social insurance, e.g., the Amish, 1.R.C. §
1402(c)(6).
1I.R.C. § 1402(c). Thus, illegal activity can generate self-employment income subject to SECA
tax. See Signorile v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1080, 1986 T.C.M. (RIA) 186, 565.6
'See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987); see also, e.g., Batok v. Commissioner, 64
T.C.M. (CCH) 1605, T.C.M. (RIA) $ 92, 727 (holding that a retired mechanic who did a one-time
job installing windows was involved in the conduct of a trade or business, and thus not subject to
SECA tax on the payment for the job); Spiegelman v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 394 (1994) (holding
that a post-doctoral student who received an academic fellowship grant for independent scientific
research did not as a result have gross income from self-employment, because it was not the product
of a trade or business). Even though the university granting the fellowship had sent Spiegelman a
Form 1099-MISC indicating the grant was "nonemployee compensation," and even though Prof.
Spiegelman paid income taxes on the amount, the court concluded that the grant did not constitute
earnings from self-employment subject to SECA tax because the professor was not required to
perform teaching or other services for the university. While the language of § 117(c) requires
inclusion in income of scholarship funds representing payment for research, the Tax Court found
that research in this case did not constitute a trade or business, and therefore the grant was not net
earnings from self-employment.
62Reg. §§ 1.1402-2(b), (c)-l.
"'See Moorehead v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 149, T.C.M. (RIA) % 93,314. Ms. Ethyle
Moorehead was still in complete control of her financial affairs, including managing inherited
interests in various oil and gas leases. The original agreement in 1946 between the corporation
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Given the policy requirement that Social Security taxes be imposed generally
on earnings from labor, as opposed to investment income, dividends and interest
income are predictably excluded from the calculation of net earnings from self
employment, as such income is not analogous to employee wages. 64 However,
as discussed further below in the context of S corporation distributions, the
Service will carefully scrutinize arrangements under the control of the taxpayer
and will recharacterize dividends as wages under certain circumstances. Simi-
larly, gains from the sale of property are excluded from the NESE base if the
circumstances of realization fit the same general requirements as those required
for characterization of income as capital gains rather than ordinary income.61
actually drilling and operating the wells and Mrs. Moorehead's husband required him to perform a
variety of acts in connection with the well operations. Twenty years after Mr. Moorehead's death
and the devise of his interests to Mrs. Moorehead, the leases were consolidated and sold to another
corporation, and the owners, including Mrs. Moorehead, were operating the wells under a joint
operating agreement which placed Mrs. Moorehead in a direct contractual relationship with the
purchaser of the natural gas. On Mrs. Moorehead's 1989 Form 1040 Schedule C, the income from
the sale of the gas was listed as receipts from her business of wholesale oil and gas sales, but she did
not pay SECA tax on the net profit. The Tax Court agreed with the Service that while Mrs.
Moorehead was not personally active in the management or operation of the trade or business, her
business was being carried on by agents on her behalf. The Court held that the taxpayer's personal
participation was not necessary for self-employment tax purposes, and that given the agreement in
question, the business had been operated on her behalf through agents, which was sufficient to
trigger SECA tax liability.
61.R.C. § 1402(a)(2). In addition, dividend or interest income received by a dealer in stock or
securities in the course of conduct of a trade or business will be included in net earnings from self-
employment for SECA tax purposes. Under Regulation section 1.1402(a)-5, interest on a loan made
solely for investment purposes or not made in the ordinary course of a trade or business (presumably
by a non-dealer), will not be included in self-employment income. Similarly, rentals from real estate,
along with the deductions attributable to that activity, are excluded from the calculation of net
earnings from self-employment, unless the income is received in the course of a trade or business as
a real estate dealer. Reg. § 1402(a)-4(a). The regulations provide that payments for the use of rooms
or other space where services are also provided to the occupant, such as hotels, boarding houses,
warehouse space or storage garages, do not constitute rentals from real estate for purposes of this
exclusion, and therefore are included in self-employment income. Reg. § 1402(a)-4(c)(2). The ser-
vices rendered to the occupants in these types of rental situations are apparently what transforms this
income from a type of passive income (for SECA purposes) into compensation for services that
should be subject to SECA.
6'The statute sets forth three circumstances for exclusion of gain or loss on the sale of an asset
from self-employment income: gain or loss considered to be from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset, I.R.C. § 1402(a)(3)(A); the cutting of timber or disposal of timber, coal or iron ore if § 631
applies to the gain or loss, I.R.C. § 1402(a)(3)(B); or the sale, exchange, involuntary conversion, or
other disposition of property that is not inventory or held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of the trade or business, I.R.C. § 1402(a)(3)(C). The statute specifies "sale or
exchange" of a capital asset as producing income excluded from self-employment income. Thus,
gains and losses from other types of dispositions (e.g., abandonment of property) may be included in
the calculation of net earnings from self-employment if they are incurred as part of a trade or
business. Note that the characterization of gain or loss as ordinary for income tax purposes (as in the
case of section 1231 gains and losses, and depreciation recapture under sections 1245 and 1250)
does not mean it is self-employment income for SECA tax purposes. Under the regulations, a
casualty loss of trade or business property other than inventory cannot be taken into account as part
of the net earnings from self-employment calculation. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-6.
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3. Classification as Self-Employed
The definition of a trade or business under sections 1402(c)(2) and (d)66
excludes performance of services as an employee; remuneration from such em-
ployment will generally be subject to FICA taxes (imposing a tax burden on
both employer and employee, and a collection and liability responsibility on the
employer). Independent contractors, as defined under the common law twenty-
factor test generally applied under the Code, are subject to SECA tax, and thus
are responsible for payment of the full 15.3 percent tax on earnings. A full
discussion of the independent contractor classification area is outside the scope
of this article, but clearly classification is the threshold issue in determining
application of the SECA tax.
D. Increasing Tax Rates, Disappearing Tax Ceiling
The final and most recent developments contributing to the current debate
over the SECA tax are the increase in SECA tax liability for higher income
taxpayers, the result of increases in Social Security tax rates beginning in 1977
but accelerated in the late 1980s, and the elimination of the wage base for the HI
portion of the FICA and SECA taxes, combined with an increase in the forma-
tion of business organizations taxed on a pass-through basis in the 1990s.67
While taxes were increased both for FICA and SECA, in general employers and
their employees subject to FICA have few options but simply to pay the taxes
(although highly compensated employees newly subject to the Medicare portion
of the FICA tax on all their income have increasingly sought to avoid it through
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements). 6 For members of partner-
ships and LLCs, and shareholders in Subchapter S corporations, however, those
entities appear to provide some shelter from at least part of this increased tax
burden, and much of the controversy of recent years has arisen from disappoint-
ment over finding that their shelters may have some leaks.
Both FICA and SECA taxes are imposed on employee wages or net earnings
from self-employment only up to the contribution and benefit, or wage base;69
as noted above, benefits under the OASDI portion of the Social Security Act are
computed based on percentages of wages recorded each year up to the amount of
I.R.C. § 1402(c)(2)-(d).67See Frost, supra note 7, at 676 ("Since 1988, we have witnessed a dramatic change in the law of
unincorporated business entities, including the evolution of limited liability companies (LLCs),
limited liability partnerships (LLPs), [and] limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs)...") See
also Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing The Corporate Inte-
gration Question, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 393 (1996).
'See Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is it
'Still' Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. I
(1993).
6I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1) (referring to section 230 of the Social Security Act (OASDI portion), codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 401) (originally enacted as Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 104
Stat. 1388, 11331(a)(2), stricken by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 312,
13207(a)(2)). Current I.R.C. § 3121(x) addresses domestic employment thresholds for FICA taxa-
tion.
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the wage base. The principle underlying the contribution and benefit base is that
Social Security should be only a base for retirement income, rather than a total
source of income replacement in retirement.7"
By limiting benefits to wages under the wage base, in combination with other
program features such as the weighted benefit formula, the program's design
assures that maximum Social Security benefits will never exceed the floor of
income they were intended to be.7 At the same time, indexing the wage base to
the growth in average wages virtually guarantees an increase every year. This
design ensured the dynamism of both the benefit formula and the revenue-
raising scheme-beneficiaries are ensured a share of the increasing gross na-
tional product, while taxpayers are required to pay in taxes a commensurate
share of the result of their increasing productivity that will rise with the increase
in the wage base each year.
In addition, by enacting several ad hoc increases in the wage base before
indexing it to the increase in average wages each year, lawmakers attempted to
insure that approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of all wages paid in the
national economy would be covered by the wage base.72 In that way, workers
could be assured that retirement benefits under Social Security, designed to
replace only forty-two to forty-five percent of the average worker's wage up to
the wage base, would provide a reasonable, but not excessive, base to which
private pensions and savings could be added to insure adequate income in retire-
ment. In 1984, the OASDHI wage base was $37,800; for 2000, the OASDI wage
base was $76,400.
These rationales for the level of the wage base are not particularly relevant in
the context of the Medicare or HI portion of the FICA and SECA taxes. Since
benefits provided by Medicare bear no relation to the level of previous earnings,
the wage base limit could be perceived as providing a bargain to higher-wage
taxpayers, since they were receiving the same Medicare coverage in retirement
earned through a much lower percentage of their overall income while they were
in the work force.
71See generally ROBERT MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY (1989).
7 For example, the maximum Social Security benefit for a worker retiring in 1999 who had always
earned at or above the wage base is $1568 per month or $18,816 per year; the maximum retired
couple's benefit in 1999 was $2352 or $28,224 per year. Average benefits for a worker and spouse
retiring in 1999 are about $15,000 per year. The Social Security Amendments of 1972 first provided
for automatic cost-of-living increases for beneficiaries; the 1977 Amendments, which substantially
revised the benefit formula to reduce benefits for future beneficiaries, provided also for an automatic
wage base increase each year that a cost-of-living increase in benefits is paid to Social Security
beneficiaries. In any year in which the cost-of-living increase for beneficiaries is calculated at less
than 0.1 percent, no cost-of-living increase will be paid and therefore no wage base increase will be
applied. In addition to the automatic wage base increases, ad hoc increases were made in several
years prior to 1983. The wage base increase is determined by the increase in average covered wages
for the previous year, as calculated by the Commissioner of Social Security under section 230 of the
Social Security Act.72See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 1994
GREEN BOOK, at 79 [hereinafter THE GREEN BOOK] reprinted in WHERE YOUR MONEY GOES: THE 1994-
95 GREEN BOOK (Brassey's Edition) (1994).
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The first action to sever the HI portion of the FICA and SECA tax base from
the OASDI portion was taken in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, when
Congress established a separate HI wage base of $125,000. 73 The rationale for
establishing the separate wage base for HI as stated in the report of the confer-
ence committee was to "improve the progressivity of the tax system. In addition,
increased revenues under the bill will provide necessary funding for the Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund and will enhance its long-term solvency."' 4 By 1993, the
HI wage base had risen to $135,000, to which the 1.45 percent of the FICA tax
attributable to HI would apply. The corresponding SECA rate for HI alone was
(and remains) 2.9 percent.
As part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, the wage base for the HI
portion of the FICA and SECA taxes was eliminated; as a result, self-employed
persons now are subject to the 2.9 percent HI tax on all net earnings from self-
employment, and employees are subject to the 1.45 percent HI tax on all wages.15
The rationale for eliminating the wage base for HI, only two years after a
separate cap was established, was essentially the same as in 1990-to improve
progressivity, and increase revenues into the HI trust fund, which was projected
at the time to be insufficient to pay its obligations as early as 2003.76
Prior to the elimination of the HI wage base, FICA and SECA taxes were a
limited issue for most highly compensated employees and self-employed per-
sons. Now that the HI tax of 1.45 percent for employees and 2.9 percent for the
self-employed is imposed on all earnings, however, the SECA tax has become a
new focus for highly compensated self-employed persons. It is particularly im-
portant for those who previously would have had no employment taxes imposed
on self-employment income from directors' fees or other secondary income
sources if they had employee wages up to or over the FICA wage base from
other employment.
As a result, tax planners have spent considerable time and effort over the last
five years developing strategies for recasting income that might be considered
self-employment earnings as passive types of income that are excluded from the
73Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1388.
74Committee Print; 101st Congress 2d Session; WMCP: 101-37.7 Frequently, individuals will have both employee wages subject to FICA and net earnings from
self-employment subject to SECA. Prior to the elimination of the HI wage base, an employee with
wages in excess of the wage base would pay no self-employment tax at all on any additional net
earnings from self-employment. Under current law, however, this holds true only for the 12.4
percent combined OASDI tax. Under sections 1401(a) and 1402(b)(1), the OASDI portion of the
SECA tax continues to be applied only to net earnings from self-employment up to the amount of the
OASDI wage base, minus the amount of employee wages subject to FICA. However, the HI portion
of the SECA tax is now applicable to the entire amount of net earnings from self-employment, even
if the taxpayer also has employee wages also subject to the HI tax. I.R.C. § 1402(b)(1). In any event,
net earnings from self-employment that total less than $400 in any taxable year are exempt from
SECA tax. I.R.C. § 1402(b)(2). A special floor of $100 is applicable under section 14020) to income
for services performed in the employ of a church or church-controlled organization which has
properly made an election under section 3121 (w).
"'HE GREEN BOOK, supra note 72, at 178.
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net earnings from self-employment base, and for restructuring the forms of
organizations so that earnings may be distributed as dividends rather than com-
pensation for services. All of these strategies can be viewed as manipulating
both the SECA tax base and the identifying characteristics used to detect a self-
employed person on whose earnings the SECA tax should be assessed. But
before addressing the theoretical issues involved in identifying both the SECA
tax base and taxpayer, some attention should be paid to the particular complaints
of the small business community, now largely organized as one or another type
of pass-through taxable entity-partnership, S corporation, LLC, sole proprietor,
or independent contractor.
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES
The increase in SECA tax liability as a result of increasing overall rates,
changes in the structure, and elimination of the HI portion of the wage base
coincided with the development of a new business entity taxed on a pass-through
basis-the limited liability company (LLC). The LLC originated in Wyoming in
1977 and, through determined and organized lobbying efforts by advocacy groups,
was recognized under every state statute by the mid-1990s as an entity with
corporate characteristics for purposes of state law (especially limited liability),"
but with sufficient partnership characteristics to qualify for pass-through taxa-
tion under the Internal Revenue Code.
While specific SECA tax rules applicable to partnerships, and thus to LLCs
taxed as partnerships, were put in place in the 1970s, complaints surfaced only
in the mid-1990s, when the HI wage base limit was eliminated. Despite the
temptation to analyze the SECA tax as a question of disparate application to
different types of business organizations, 78 in fact all of the statutory, as well as
regulatory, rules developed to deal with participants in pass-through tax entities
are grounded in an attempt to discern the part of a self-employed person's
income that is actually attributable to her own labor.79
A. Shareholder/Employees of Closely Held and Subchapter S Corporations
The dividing line between employee and self-employed can become blurred
when a principal or sole shareholder-employee of a closely held corporation
77See Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1459, 1460 (1998) (noting that the LLC originated in 1977 with the Wyoming statute); see also Fritz
supra note 12, at 813, n.5 (noting that all 50 states plus the District of Columbia have LLC statutes).78See Fritz, supra note 12, at 812.79To some extent, this is a traditional inquiry in tax policy and legislative development, given the
origins of the income tax and the early reluctance of the Supreme Court as well as legislators to tax
"capital" directly. See Lester B. Snyder, Taxation With an Attitude: Can We Rationalize the Distinc-
lion Between 'Earned' and 'Unearned' Income?, 18 VA. TAX. REV. 241, 244 (1998). As demon-
strated by the discussion above, however, the connection to Social Security benefit accrual makes
the question of distinguishing between income from labor and income from capital less one of
theoretical distinctions, and more one of political preference and administrative ease. What is easy in
the FICA setting, however, becomes problematic in the SECA context.
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receives compensation for services performed outside her regular duties. Fre-
quently, prior to the elimination of the HI wage base, taxpayers would want any
additional income above the wage base to be considered self-employment earn-
ings, since no additional tax would be imposed under SECA and the earnings
would constitute earnings for purposes of making deductible contributions to a
retirement plan such as a defined contribution or defined benefit Keogh plan."0
In addition, if any compensation could be characterized as earnings from self-
employment, the taxpayer could deduct expenses allocable to those earnings in
arriving at a net amount subject to SECA, a degree of flexibility unavailable to
employees. The Service has frequently challenged taxpayers' assertions that
amounts received from a corporate employer by an employee-shareholder could
be anything but employee wages.8'
Since the elimination of the HI wage base, however, the 2.9 percent tax due
offsets most incentives to claim this income as earnings. In general, an S corpo-
ration shareholder's distributive share of corporate income will not be included
in net earnings from self-employment.8 2 However, an S shareholder who is an
officer of the corporation and who also performs substantial services for the
corporation will be considered an employee whose reasonable compensation is
subject to wage withholding under FICA. 3
"See I.R.C. §§ 401(c)(I), 404(a)(8)(c).
"In Jacobs v. Commissioner, the Tax Court examined the case of a sole shareholder and CEO of a
corporation owning two gas stations, from which the taxpayer received "compensation" payments
which he reported as self-employment income subject to SECA. The taxpayer also worked for
another corporation, a gasoline distributor, of which he and his parents each owned one third, and
from which he received a salary which he reported as wage income subject to FICA. The taxpayer's
deduction for contributing a substantial portion of the income reported as self-employment income
was denied by the Service on the grounds that he was an employee of his wholly owned corporation
and therefore was not eligible to make deductible Keogh contributions. The Tax Court agreed,
saying that even though the taxpayer's compensation at issue was nominally a director's fee, it was
actually paid to him in compensation for substantial services performed for the company, which
made him an employee rather than an independent contractor. Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
(CCH) 1470, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 91 93,570. Similarly, in a recent private letter ruling, the Service
found that the taxpayer who, along with his wife, owned 100 percent of a corporation of which he
was the president and manager, was in fact an employee of the corporation, and amounts received as
"management fees" were wages rather than self-employment income. See P.L.R. 1995-30-005 (July
28, 1995). The key issue, as in the line of revenue rulings on which the Service relied, was the extent
and substantial nature of the services performed for the corporation by the shareholder-director. See
also Rev. Rul. 71-86, 1971-1 C.B. 285; Rev. Rul. 73-361, 1973-2 C.B. 331; Rev. Rul. 82-83, 1982-1
C.B. 151.
1
2Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225.
83Rev. Rul. 73-361, 1973-2 C.B. 331 (holding that an officer-shareholder of an S corporation who
performed substantial services for the corporation in exchange for cash remuneration was an em-
ployee of the corporation whose wages were subject to FICA tax). See also IRS Publication 589 at 7.
Even in cases where the taxpayer does not characterize as wages an S corporation distribution in
connection with services, the Service can recharacterize such distributions. See Radtke v. United
States, 712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (holding "dividends" received by S corporation sole
shareholder and full-time employee, who drew no salary, to be wages subject to FICA tax), aff'd per
curiam, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding distributions characterized as dividends to non-salaried shareholder, president,
treasurer, director, and employee of S corporation to be wages subject to FICA tax).
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The distinction between distributions as dividends and distributions as earn-
ings creates a somewhat arbitrary distinction, for FICA and SECA purposes,
between sole proprietors who incorporate and obtain S corporation tax status
and unincorporated sole proprietors. A sole proprietor ordinarily will have all
earnings from her trade or business included in NESE for purposes of SECA
taxes. As a general rule, however, S corporation shareholders normally will be
taxed on the corporation's income as ordinary net income,84 but not as earnings
for FICA or SECA purposes.
Employees of the S corporation will receive wages subject to FICA tax, and,
therefore, where a shareholder behaves in a fashion that would lead to a conclu-
sion that her relationship is actually that of performing services for the S corpo-
ration, employment taxes will be assessed. Thus, the Service will rely on the
normal indicators of corporate relationships to determine the payroll tax treat-
ment of business income, but these assumptions are backed up by the normal
administrative scrutiny of taxpayer characterizations, and substance will trump
form where appropriate. The presumption, in this case, is against a finding of
wages in the S corporation setting.
B. Partners in Limited Partnerships
Partners in limited partnerships, in contrast, are subject to specific, special
treatment under the SECA tax, in recognition of the different roles limited and
general partners have traditionally been required to play in their partnership
businesses, as a matter of state partnership law.85 General partners traditionally
have been active managers in the running of the partnership's income-producing
activities, while limited partners have been the passive investors, resembling
traditional investors more than proprietors of a business. Thus, the FICA-SECA
tax treatment of partnership income has relied on assumptions, once again, about
the relationship between the partner and the business as the indicator of whether
or not wages are being paid.
The normal rule is contained in section 1402(a),86 which generally includes in
the definition of net earnings from self-employment a partner's distributive share
of the net income of the partnership derived from the partnership's trade or
business. This provision also allows distributive shares of partnership losses
from the partnership's trade or business to reduce net income from self-employ-
ment.87 A partnership, for purposes of section 1402, has been interpreted broadly
to include any organization other than a trust, estate, or corporation which is
"Income of an S corporation retains its character as trade or business as it is attributed to S
corporation shareholders in accordance with their interests in the corporation. I.R.C. § 1366(b).
Congress reaffirmed this pass-through tax characteristic in the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, which provided, among other things, for pass-through treatment of S corporation distributions
during loss years. Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1309, 110 Stat. 1755, 1783-84.
"See Fritz, supra note 12, at 848.
5
"I.R.C. § 1402(a).
1
7Rev. Rul. 54-223, 1954-1 C.B. 174.
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recognized as a partnership for federal tax purposes, regardless of the
organization's status under state partnership law in the state in which the part-
nership is organized.88 In order to trigger SECA tax on the partners' distributive
shares of income, the partnership itself must be engaged in a trade or business.89
Prior to 1978, a partner's distributive share was includible in net earnings
from self-employment regardless of the nature of her partnership interest; thus
both general and limited partners were subject to SECA taxes even if the limited
partner performed no services for the partnership. The only exception was for
retirement payments made to partners, provided that the partner performed no
services for the partnership, the partner's capital share had been paid out in full,
and the retirement payments were the only obligation of the other partners to the
retired partner. 90
However, Congress became concerned about the establishment of limited
partnerships in the 1970s as investment vehicles, the chief purpose of which was
to earn insured status under Social Security (and Medicare) for older investors
who may not have been covered under the system during their working lives,
such as professionals and government employees. Thus the Social Security
Amendments of 1977 provided that, beginning in 1978, limited partners would
not be subject to SECA tax on their distributive shares of partnership income, so
long as the amounts received were not guaranteed payments under section 707(c)9'
for services performed by the limited partner.92 This change was made at a time
when the value of Social Security benefits was still widely perceived to out-
weigh their tax cost, given the relatively low tax rates and the application of the
tax rate only to income up to the wage base.
Thus, general partners who may have no personal involvement in the
partnership's trade or business may still be subject to SECA tax on their dis-
tributive shares of partnership income, while limited partners will not be. A
partner who has both a general and limited partnership interest in the partnership
can use the allocation process either to minimize self-employment income (by
performing services only in his general partner capacity so that only that dis-
tributive share will be considered self-employment income), or create self-em-
ployment income for purposes of deferral into a retirement plan (presuming
that his income tax savings from deferral will exceed the 2.9 percent HI portion
of the SECA tax now applicable to the entire amount of self-employment
earnings).
"
5Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(f).
"9Reg § 1.1402(a)-2(d). See Rev. Rul. 75-525, 1975-2 C.B. 350 (holding distributive share of
income from investment partnership to not be self-employment income); see also Calvert v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 69, 1982 T.C.M. (RIA) 82,649.
'I.R.C. § 1402(a)(10).
9
.R.C. § 707(c).921.R.C. § 1402(13). Apparently, payments received by a limited partner based on capital invested
in the partnership would not constitute net earnings from self-employment. Presumably only the
limited partner distributive share would be excluded for a partner who is both a limited and a general
partner.
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While in most cases a written partnership agreement conforming with either
the general or limited partnership statute of the state of operation will clearly
indicate the existence of a partnership, in many instances a less formal combina-
tion of taxpayers doing business together, or controlling investments together,
may constitute a partnership for tax purposes generally. In light of the different
treatment of limited and general partners for SECA tax purposes, the finding
that an interest in a joint venture is a general partner interest will lead to SECA
tax liability. 3
C. Members of Limited Liability Companies
1. In General
Limited liability companies (LLCs) are rapidly becoming the preferred alter-
native to both S corporations and partnerships as a form of organization that
provides many of the flow-through tax benefits of a partnership while providing
the shelter from personal liability for members that was previously available
only to corporations.94 All states have enacted LLC statutes providing specific
guidelines for LLC agreements and operations, and the Service has issued guide-
lines allowing taxpayers to choose to have an LLC treated for federal income tax
purposes as either a partnership or an association.95 The SECA tax treatment of
LLC members continues to be the most controversial aspect of both the LLC
and the SECA tax areas, and the Service has issued two sets of proposed regula-
tions on the subject that are still under debate. Considerable uncertainty contin-
ues to exist regarding to the SECA tax treatment of the distributive shares of
93This issue has arisen repeatedly in the oil and gas leasing context (as in Moorehead, discussed
supra note 63). For example, in Johnson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that income from
working interests in an oil and gas venture was earnings from self-employment, despite the lack of
active participation of the taxpayer in question in the operations. The court deemed the owners of
these interests to have formed a general partnership as defined under section 7702, but not a limited
partnership, as their arrangement did not meet the state law requirements for limited partnership
status. This result was reached despite the taxpayer's partially limited liability under the terms of the
agreement, and her lack of active participation. Johnson v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 603,
1990 T.C.M. (RIA) 90,461. The Service has attempted to apply the requirements for formation of a
limited partnership very strictly, as in the case of Gamma Farms v. Commissioner. In this case, the
partnership had intended to be a limited partnership, and had followed all the steps required for
limited partnership status except for filing the required Certificate of Limited Partnership; when this
error was discovered, a correct Certificate was filed the following year. The Service and the district
court maintained that because of this failure, the taxpayer-partner would have been liable to creditors
as a general partner and therefore the exception from SECA tax liability under section 1402(a)(13)
was not applicable. The Ninth Circuit, in overturning the district court, held that the focus should be
on the actual limited liability of the taxpayer under the agreement, and that in light of the clear good
faith attempt to comply with state law requirements for limited partnerships, and the corrected filing,
creditors would have been on notice of the taxpayer's limited liability. Therefore, the taxpayer was
held to be a limited partner and thus not subject to SECA tax under section 1402(a)(13). Gamma
Farms v. Commissioner, 956 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).
"See Hamill, supra note 77; see also Lee, supra note 38.
95The so-called "check-the-box" regulations issued under section 7701 provide that LLCs can be
treated as either partnerships or associations, except for single member LLCs, which are treated as
sole proprietorships. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-(2)(a), -2(c)(2), -3(a), -3(b)(l)(ii).
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income of LLC members, since there is no "limited" or "general" distinction
between members, who thus receive little guidance from the SECA rules appli-
cable to limited partnerships. 96
In 1994, the Service ruled that, in the case of a conversion of a general
partnership into an LLC in which all of the partners would continue to be
actively engaged in the business just as before the conversion, the distributive
shares of LLC income and loss as described in section 702(a)(8) 97 would be
includible in computing net earnings from self-employment under section 1402,98
and would be subject to the SECA tax. 99 The Service based its ruling on an
interpretation of Regulation section 1.1402(a)-2(f),1°° which provides that, for
the purpose of determining net earnings from self-employment, a partnership
will be considered as such if it is recognized as one for income tax purposes
under section 7701.10' Since the LLC in question was ruled to be treated as a
partnership for income tax purposes, the members of the LLC would be consid-
ered partners for SECA tax purposes. Therefore, their distributive shares of LLC
income and loss would be includible in determining net earnings from self
employment, and subject to the SECA tax, because section 1402(a)(13) °2 did
not exclude them.
The Service did not give a specific basis for its determination that section
1402(a)(13)'s exception for limited partners did not apply to these LLC mem-
bers. However, it can be inferred that the critical factors in the ruling were the
LLC agreement's designation of each member as a manager of the LLC, the
exclusion of non-members of the LLC from manager status, and the continued
active conduct of the business of the LLC by the members. The state statute
under which the LLC was organized required that the business affairs of an LLC
be run by managers, each of whom was a natural person.
2. 1994 Regulatory Clarification
On December 28, 1994, the Service issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
and a notice of public hearings on Proposed Regulation section 1.1402(a)-
18(c)(3), °3 which addressed the SECA tax treatment of LLC members. The
proposed regulation allowed an LLC member to be treated as a limited partner
for the purpose of the exception for limited partners provided in section
1402(a)(13), but only if the member was not a manager of the LLC, the LLC
could have been formed as a limited partnership under the laws of the jurisdic-
'Similar interpretive problems exist under other provisions of the Code, such as section 469(h)(2),
providing a special rule for passive losses of limited partners.
971.R.C. § 702(a)(8).
981.R.C. § 1402.
9P.L.R. 1994-32-018 (May 16, 1994).
")Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(f).
'
0 1
.R.C. § 7701.
1'2 1.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
-
3Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)- 18(c)(3), 59 Fed. Reg. 67,254 (1994).
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tion, and the member could have qualified as a limited partner in such a limited
partnership in that jurisdiction.
The proposed regulation defined the term "manager" as a person who, alone
or together with others, was vested with the continuing exclusive authority to
make the management decisions necessary to conduct the business for which the
LLC was formed. If there were no designated or elected managers who had
continuing exclusive authority to manage the LLC, all of the members would be
treated as managers, regardless of any variations of management authority among
the members under either the applicable LLC statute or the LLC's controlling
documents.'"
The explanation accompanying the proposed regulations stated that these re-
quirements were designed to insure that the treatment of LLC members who
participate in the management of the LLC was consistent with the treatment of
limited partners, who might have became liable for the obligations of the limited
partnership if they became actively involved in the business of the limited part-
nership. The regulation also appeared to be designed to insure that LLC mem-
bers could not obtain a result for self-employment tax purposes that they could
not achieve through operation as a limited partnership in the same jurisdiction
(if, for example, the state law prohibited the conduct of certain activities through
a limited partnership).
3. 1997 Approach and Furor
The 1994 proposed regulations proved somewhat controversial, and the Trea-
sury Department withdrew them in early 1997, substituting new proposed regu-
lations," 5 which were scarcely less controversial than the original rules."6  A
key issue that the Service struggled with in developing its new proposals was
whether to impose an actual "service" test to determine whether self-employ-
ment taxes should be imposed, as had been suggested in several quarters." 7
The 1997 proposed regulations, on which Congress placed a moratorium in
August of 1997,' 8 but which never have been withdrawn, essentially maintain
the current law exemption from SECA taxes for limited partners. The regula-
tions address the LLC issue by extending limited partner status to all members
of entities treated like limited partnerships, including LLCs, regardless of whether
the individual would be viewed as a limited partner under applicable state law,
unless a different status can be demonstrated."' The Service terms this rebut-
"'Prop. Reg. § 1. 1402(a)-I 8(c)(3), 59 Fed. Reg. 67,254 (1994).
105Prop. Reg. § 1. 1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
"'Congressional Republicans attacked the proposed regulations, calling them a "stealth tax in-
crease" on small businesses. See Fritz, supra note 12, at 848 n. 131.
"I7 RS Looking to Finalize LLC Self-Employment Tax Rules, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 5, 1996)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 110-11); see also L.A. Bar Members Suggest
Ways to Classify LLC Owners as Partners, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 15, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX
lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 96-32).
""Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 1I1 Stat. 788.
"'Prop. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2(i)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997); Prop. Reg. §§ 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(i)-
(iii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997) (providing three standards under which the rebuttable presumption of
limited partner status could be overcome).
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table presumption of limited partner status "a functional approach," designed,
apparently, to provide uniform treatment for members of both partnerships and
LLCs.10 The tests or "standards" which, if applicable to a member of a partner-
ship or LLC, would result in reclassification as a general partner whose distribu-
tive share of entity income would be subject to SECA, are (1) personal liability
for debts of the partnership or LLC;" (2) authority under applicable local law
to contract on behalf of the partnership;"12 or (3) participation in the partnership's
trade or business for more than 500 hours during the partnership's taxable year."3
These regulations would provide an escape hatch even for those members of
partnerships or LLCs who do qualify for SECA tax treatment under these stan-
dards, at least for that part of their NESE that could be classified as a return on
capital invested in the partnership."4 Essentially, the approach of the regulations
is to allow for the possibility of possession of different types or classes of
interests in a partnership or LLC, and for exclusion, as return on investment
capital, of income attributable to an interest that essentially looks like a limited
partnership interest."5 These exclusion provisions would apply if two conditions
were met upon acquisition of the class of interest to which limited partner
treatment would attach: the class of interest must be one in which true limited
partners (who qualify for such treatment without regard to these special excep-
tions) own a substantial and continuing interest," 6 and the rights and obligations
must be identical for true limited partners and the partner seeking to qualify for
limited partner treatment under these rules." 7
Significantly, however, the proposed regulations also exclude "service part-
ners in a service partnership" (such as one involving the performance of legal,
medical, accounting, or other types of professional services), regardless of the
partnership's identification under state law as a limited partnership, from treat-
ment as limited partnerships under section 1402(a)(13) and thus from the reach
of the proposed regulations."' The proposed regulations do provide a de mini-
"°Prop. Reg. §§ 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(i) to (iii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997).
"'Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997). The definition of personal liability
is the same definition used in Regulation section 301.7701-3(b)(2)(ii) for limited liability of foreign
eligible entities for purposes of the classification of business organizations for federal tax purposes.
"
2Prop. Reg. § I .1402(a)-2(h)(2)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1604 (1997).
'"Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(iii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997). This standard is comparable to
the levels of activity that constitute material participation for purposes of the passive activity loss
rules under Temporary Regulation section 1.469-5T(a)(1 ).
"Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3), (4), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997).
5Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997).
"6prop. Reg § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)(i), (ii), -2(h)(4)(i), (ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997). A "substantial
interest in a class of interest" would be "determined based on all the relevant facts and circum-
stances. In all cases, however, ownership of 20 percent or more of a specific class of interest is
considered substantial." Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(iv), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997); Prop. Reg. §
1. 1402(a)-2(h)(3)(i), (4)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997).
"'Prop. Reg. § I. 1402(a)-2(h)(3)(ii), -2(h)(4)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997).
"
8See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(5), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997) (creating an exception for service
partners in service partnerships); Prop. Reg. § I. 1402(a)-2(h)(6)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997).
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mis activity exception to the "service partner" definition, but offer no definition
of "substantially all" of a partnership's activities that might trigger the exception
for such a partnership.' 9
D. Reactions and Other Proposals
Many analysts welcomed the general approach of the regulations as an at-
tempt by the Treasury to provide a uniform approach, not tied to state partner-
ship or other legal definitions, for members of all entities treated like partner-
ships under federal tax law. 2" However, the exclusion of "service partnerships"
from the presumption that entity income is not services income that should be
taxed under SECA helped to create a firestorm of opposition to the regulations,
and eventually led to the moratorium enacted in 1997.21 Since the issuance of
the proposed regulations, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation has
written to Congress with a legislative proposal in reaction to the proposed regu-
lations. 2  In June, 2000, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) also wrote to Congress supporting the ABA's proposal and urging
immediate legislative action to address the SECA tax issue. 23
The ABA's proposal would amend section 1402(a)(13) to provide that income
from any type of entity, to any participant in that entity (general or limited
partner, member or manager of LLC, etc.), that is "attributable to capital" would
be exempt from SECA taxes. This proposal contains two safe harbors for deter-
mining income attributable to capital: either an amount in excess of reasonable
compensation for services rendered by the partner (or person treated as a part-
ner), or an amount equal to a reasonable rate of return on that partner's capital
contribution to the enterprise would be treated as return on capital rather than as
income subject to SECA.'24 Other analysts have developed similar approaches. 25
What is interesting about this approach is that it attempts to divorce the tax
treatment of certain persons from the common law definitions and assumptions
about what those persons-limited partners, for example-do in the context of
I"Prop. Reg. § 1. 1402(a)-2(h)(6)(iii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1704 (1997).
'
20See Burgess J.W. &William L. Raby, Partners, LLC Members and SE Tax, 87 TAX NOTES (TA)
665, 667 (May I, 2000).
1211d.; see also supra note 106.
'
22See ABA Tax Section Suggests Legislative Fix for LLC Self-Employment Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY
(July 13, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 1991 TNT 133-23) [hereinafterABA Tax
Section Letter].
123See Letter from David A. Lifson, Chair, Tax Executive Committee, AICPA to Sen. William
Roth, members of the Senate Finance Committee and Cong. Bill Archer, Chairman of the House
Ways & Means Committee (June 22, 2000) (on file with author) ("The AICPA had submitted a
similar legislative recommendation to Congress in February of 1998 and would now like to express
its support for the ABA's 1999 recommendation.")
'
24See ABA Tax Section Letter, supra note 122.
'
2
-See, e.g., Fritz, supra note 12, at 861 (noting that approach based on a rebuttable presumption
that a member of a passthrough entity is an investor with returns on capital that should not be subject
to SECA would be established).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 54, No. I
REFLECTIONS ON THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX
their partnership activities. It thus addresses the problem created by the very
specific language of the current statute and regulations which only define terms
in the partnership setting; the problem of what to do with LLC members' in-
come is not solved by treating the LLC as a partnership under the general
classification rules, since the SECA tax provisions reference only "partners" and
"partnerships," not "all entities treated like partnerships under the Code."' 26
However, both the 1997 proposed regulations and the ABA-proposed legisla-
tion demonstrate that any method of identifying self-employment income is
necessarily based on assumptions about the relationship of the individual to the
entity producing the income. The differences among proposed approaches essen-
tially revolve around what outward indicators-state law partnership definitions,
presumptions about what limited partners can or cannot do, assumptions that
material participation signifies a wage-earning activity-are used to identify
returns on labor rather than on capital.
It should be noted that long before the controversy involving LLCs emerged
(indeed, long before LLCs themselves were even a gleam in the Wyoming
legislature's eye), the Treasury Department, in the context of major tax reform
proposals, had suggested that an S corporation shareholder's distributive share
of income be treated as trade or business income, a treatment similar to that
afforded both general partners and unincorporated sole proprietors.' Without
further limitation, this would have resulted in all flow-through income being
subject to SECA tax, thus in all likelihood subjecting some income from capital
to SECA tax. This kind of approach might well be applied in the LLC context,
and constitutes the opposite end of the spectrum of approaches from the ABA/
AICPA proposals.
IV. CORE ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
A. In General
There are two basic approaches to take in determining whether a self-em-
ployed person's income or a portion of it is properly taxable under SECA. First,
the statute or the regulations could incorporate an assumption on the basis of
some observable category (relationship to entity, for example) that leads to an
"'
26See Frances Cokes v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 222 (1988), in which a venture that did not meet
the state statutory definition of a limited partnership was found by the Tax Court to produce straight-
forward trade or business income to a passive investor, all of which income was therefore subject to
SECA taxes. Because of this and other decisions like it, the Rabys point out that "LLCs and limited
liability partnerships are not 'limited partnerships' under state law ... since 'limited partners' is not
being used, say the Tax Court cases, as a generic description of partners who are in some fashion
limited as compared to other partners. Rather, say these cases, a 'limited partner' is one defined
specifically as such in a state limited partnership statute. How, then, can it even be argued that
members of LLCs and partners in LLPs are nevertheless 'limited partners' for purposes of section
1402(a)(13)?" Raby & Raby, supra note 120.
t27Technical Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the House Comm.
On Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 5228, 5256 (1969)[hereinafter Tax Reform Hearings].
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automatic result--either to tax or not to tax. Second, and alternatively, the
Commissioner could be required to engage in a facts and circumstances test for
each and every taxpayer and for each and every item of income in order to make
precise judgments. A third way would be some combination of these approaches,
which is essentially what is used under current law and regulations. These choices
are, of course, emblematic of the choice between simplicity and equity that must
repeatedly be made in devising tax provisions. 128
Most analysts have suggested that the SECA tax issue is a problem of rules
that improperly tax different business entities differently and unfairly. Their
response, as discussed above, has generally been to propose reforms of which
the principal objective is uniformity of taxation of members of different types of
pass-through entities, to be achieved by largely excluding income of all partici-
pants from such entities unless it can be demonstrably connected to wage-earn-
ing activity.' 29 The current rules, complex though they are, will not be much
improved upon by any of these suggested reforms without substantial exclusion
from SECA taxes of income that would be taxed under current law.
The complications of current law, and the Treasury Department's proposed
regulations, are required by the underlying imperative to tie Social Security
benefit eligibility to earnings. The difficulties are created by the lack of an
employer-employee relationship, which is normally the signifier of wages paid
on account of services rendered. In the absence of such an outward marker, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish with absolute certainty between wages
and income unconnected with services, such as income from capital of various
types. 130
One problem with past examinations of the SECA tax issue is that most have
concentrated on the effects of the assumptions that must be made in order to
make what is essentially an income tax perform the functions of a wage tax. It is
almost inevitable that different organizational forms will result in different SECA
tax consequences if the purpose of the rules is to determine the real character of
income flowing from a business entity without having to make a facts and
circumstances test in each case. The result of such analyses has generally been
to suggest even more extreme assumptions about income flowing through pass-
through entities-either that it is all is trade or business income and subject to
SECA '3 or that all of it is presumptively return on capital and not subject to
2
'See PECHMAN, supra note 4.
29See Fritz, supra note 12, at 812-13 ("Current self-employment tax laws trigger varying results
for individual owners of different forms of business. In addition, application of these disparate rules
is based, at least in part, on ownership status rather than employment-related activities. Further, the
self-employment tax often is imposed in a manner inconsistent with the basic principles underlying
application of the employment-related tax laws.").
'
3
°See JANE GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL INCOME (1994) ("While wage
taxation may appear to be quite straightforward, it is extremely difficult - indeed, probably impos-
sible - to separate capital income from labor income for closely held businesses where the owner
may supply both capital and labor services. (The current payroll tax simply ignores this problem and
thus taxes some of the capital income of these businesses.)"); see also Snyder, supra note 79
(discussing the difficulties of separating earned and unearned income).
1 1See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 127.
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The following discussion, in contrast, organizes SECA tax issues around three
different central conceptual difficulties, in an attempt to provide a slightly differ-
ent framework for analysis of the choices for reform. One way to approach the
analysis is to focus on the self-employment tax's inherent conflicts, in both its
functions and its conceptual framework. A second approach is to examine the
difficulty of clearly identifying the SECA tax base, to which there seem to be
two possible approaches, exclusionary and inclusionary. Finally, there is the
difficulty of properly identifying the SECA taxpayer, which has been approached
traditionally by relying, in the tax law, on non-tax law categories that have been
assumed to be clear indicators of the individual's functional relationship with
the business entity.
B. SECA's Internal Conflicts
The first key to deciphering the problems of the SECA tax generally is to
recognize at least two inherent dualities in the conceptual framework of the
system. First, the SECA tax is both a revenue collection device and a benefit
accrual system, just like the FICA tax on which it was modeled. The problem is
that the presumptions that have worked fairly well in the FICA context since the
1930s are not particularly applicable in the SECA context. Second, the SECA
tax is an income tax that is required to perform like a wage tax-again, the
FICA tax model has been imposed on fluid working and investment relation-
ships and entities that do not fit squarely into the preexisting notions of what
wages are and how they are paid.
1. Dual Functions - Collecting Revenue and Benefit accrual
The Social Security system was established with a clear presumption that a
public retirement income support program was politically sustainable only if it
was seen to, in some sense, belong to the workers for whom it was to provide
benefits. A contributory wage tax, dedicated solely to financing Social Security
benefits, made political sense, because it was thought that it would create an
immediate and direct connection between the taxpayer and the benefit system.
Moreover, since contributory pensions and annuity policies were a fairly well
understood concept, the idea of contributing to one's future retirement security
in the public setting was made less novel by linking it, through the sort of living
analogy of the payroll tax, to more traditional and accepted concepts of life
insurance policies and pension annuities.'33
'
32See Fritz, supra note 12, at 850-853.
133See United States Committee on Economic Security, Report of the Committee on Economic
Security, reprinted in THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER
BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 45 (National Confer-
ence on Social Welfare, 50th Anniversary Ed. 1985) ("Contributory annuities are unquestionably
preferable to noncontributory pensions. They come to the workers as a right, whereas the noncon-
tributory pensions must be conditioned on a 'means' test."); see also Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolu-
tion of Entitlement, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1085-1139.
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At the same time, the entitlement to benefits itself was seen as critically
connected with a life of work and contribution to society as a laboring indi-
vidual, in contrast to entitlement based on need. The latter was rejected as a
basis for the social insurance benefit, not surprisingly given the long history of
contempt for such needs-based benefits in American and, indeed, Western his-
tory generally. "' The practical consideration of how to keep track of individual
workers' quarters of work in covered employment, on which benefit entitlement
would be based, merged with the need to collect the contributory wage tax
directly from employees and their employers (as part of the dual contributory tax
structure). Coupled with the consideration that very few wage workers paid any
income tax in the 1930s, the practical result was the FICA withholding tax
system, which gives a direct, tangible signal to workers that they are earning
credit toward their eventual retirement benefit and contributing to the financing
of the system as a whole.
It is important to recognize that, although the benefit-accrual and revenue-
collection functions, in the FICA context, are not necessarily contradictory in
purpose or result, they are nonetheless different functions. FICA contributions
(as well as SECA payments) are collected under the Internal Revenue Code,
while Social Security benefits are based on earnings record and quarters of
coverage requirements under the Social Security Act. The two sets of require-
ments are technically unrelated, and, in fact, eligibility for benefits is uncon-
nected to actual payment of FICA or SECA taxes.'35
When one turns from the FICA system to the issue of those earning income
outside the employer-employee relationship, an entirely different set of prob-
lems arises. The convenience of the payroll tax withholding system is replaced
by the difficulties of assessing a wage tax where there is no payroll. Yet, the
principal reason for development of the SECA tax was extension of Social
Security coverage, not Social Security taxation.
The question of how best to collect a particular source of tax revenue is
probably best analyzed from a categorical perspective, that is, how a particular
tax rate or type of tax is best applied to a particular category of income. SECA
taxes, if considered solely from the revenue-collection perspective, could be
simply and effectively assessed on all income flowing from pass-through entities
and sole proprietorships, without regard to issues of characterization beyond the
general issue of ordinary income as differentiated from capital gains and losses,
something the income tax system may not do well, but at least is equipped to
handle.'36 Benefit accrual, on the other hand, is a question of individual personal
characteristics and work history, regardless of any business or tax category into
"'
34See Orloff, supra note 35; see also Dilley, supra note 133.
'
35See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401,411, 414 (2000).
'
36See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), (b), (c); 1202; 1211; 1212(b); 1222; 1235. But see Snyder, supra note 79.
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which the worker might fit. 37 Since benefits are supposed to be based on ser-
vice, not income, the accrual structure should have little to do with issues that
typically arise in the calculation of NESE, such as balancing business losses
against business income to arrive at a net income figure that in reality has little
to do with actual earnings or work effort of the individual.
Thus, one inherent problem of the current SECA tax structure is that, since it
is required to fulfill this dual function, the undifferentiated income flowing to
individuals-whether from an individual's solo business activity or an interest in
a limited partnership-must be recharacterized to fit into either the wages or
non-wages category, so that quarters of coverage may be earned, and SECA
taxes paid. Therefore, one way to begin to untangle this web might be to con-
sider a separation of the benefit accrual functions of the SECA tax from its
revenue collection functions-a different type of tax, such as an income surtax,
for self-employed persons, might be a better approach, at least from a strictly
revenue-raising perspective.
2. Dual Character - Income Tax and Wage Tax
A similar duality exists when the SECA tax is compared as a tax to its model,
the FICA payroll tax. The FICA tax, as discussed above, was developed as a
wage tax for a variety of reasons, involving questions of both principle and
administrative convenience, at a time when the income tax was not yet a middle-
class tax. While the changing nature of work and the ability of highly paid
executives to receive their compensation in forms that are more difficult for the
FICA system to reach are putting pressure on the true mandatory and inclusive
nature of the tax,'38 for most standard employer-employee situations the FICA
withholding tax system still works pretty much as originally intended. In fact,
there may be some reason to think that the wage tax is so symbiotically linked to
the income tax withholding system that the latter might have trouble existing
without the former.
The framework upon which the FICA tax is built, however, is a set of as-
sumptions imbedded in the tax structure itself about what is actually occurring
when an employer pays money or property to an employee who is performing or
has performed or promises to perform services. That property or money is deemed
to be wages-paid in exchange for the services-even if the employer and
employee in question attempt to characterize it as something else.'39 Thus, there
is nothing intrinsic about the nature of wage income, as opposed to any other
type of income-income is tagged as wages by virtue of its exchange between
employer and employee (directly or indirectly).
The SECA tax, however, has never been a wage tax. Even on its face it is an
'
37See JOHN LANGBEIN & BRUCE WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 153-159 (3d ed. 2000)
(explaining benefit accrual).
'
18See Halperin, supra note 68.
3
'See I.R.C. § 83; see also Alves v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984).
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income tax, assessed on income net of expenses, just as the income tax is
assessed for persons with Schedule C trade or business income. An income tax
approach is necessary, because there is no possibility of the type of exchange
that transforms income for employees into wages because the income is trans-
ferred from the employer. However, the self-contained nature of self-employ-
ment income creates far more opportunities for manipulation than employee
wage income does.
For example, the ability to reduce or eliminate NESE by ordinary business
expenses or other business losses has no equivalent in the FICA tax system,
under which wages are taxed from the first dollar, even though an employee's
overall income may be reduced for income tax purposes for various personal and
business expenses.140 Thus, because of the very nature of the SECA tax as an
income tax, it is immediately out of parallel with the payroll tax system, both in
terms of earnings records established for benefit purposes and taxes collected for
revenue purposes.
Moreover, the employee typically has little or no control over how her salary
is to be paid, on what schedule she will receive it, and how much is to be
withheld for payroll and income tax purposes. In contrast, the self-employed
person potentially controls both the amount and the timing of income receipt,
and therefore of SECA taxes paid. As a result, the self-employed person has
greater potential for understatement of SECA income and underpayment of SECA
taxes. As long as the Social Security benefits tied to the SECA tax payments
were seen as valuable, this was not a substantial problem, as witnessed by the
rules enacted in the 1970s to limit the ability of investment partners to transform
their investment returns into trade or business income for SECA purposes in
order to build up benefit coverage.
Now, however, the opposite incentive is driving the debate, and the SECA
structure appears to have few safeguards against the underpayment possibilities.
Moreover, the current proposals for revising the treatment of members of pass-
through entities under SECA would in most cases remove the presumption that
distributable shares are SECA wage equivalents, thus further distorting the dif-
ferences between employees and the self-employed. Again, the complete solu-
tion to this distortion may be to abandon the wage tax model for self-employed
persons, and substitute an income surtax to fulfill the revenue collection func-
tions, and some sort of deemed earnings credit system for earnings record and
benefit calculation purposes.
C. Defining the Base
Another possible angle to take on the problems of the SECA tax is to consider
the question primarily as one of properly (or most easily) defining the SECA tax
base. The inherent difficulties of using an income tax to perform a wage tax
'1'See PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 65. (describing the mechanisms of the personal income tax and
deductions).
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function are clearest where considering how to define the wage portion of the
self-employed person's total income. The threshold question is how should the
totality of a self-employed person's income be treated-that is, can we separate
investment income from trade or business income? Then, can we determine how
much of trade or business income is derived from labor as opposed to equity?
As suggested above, there seem to be two possible ways of defining the SECA
base-one exclusionary and the other inclusionary-and both are necessarily
based on assumptions about the context in which SECA income is received by
individuals.
The current approach of the SECA tax, with respect to both self-employed
sole proprietors, and members of pass-through entities such as partnerships and
S corporations, seems to be an inclusionary approach, with some limitations.
Under this approach, income is presumed to be NESE unless it is identifiable as
a return on capital, that is, either dividends or income analogous to dividends.
Certainly for sole proprietors or persons with Schedule C trade or business
income generally, the presumption of SECA is that all such income is the equiva-
lent of wages and is taxable under SECA. For general partners in either general
or limited partnerships, the same treatment generally applies-all distributive
shares of partnership income are included in NESE, so long as the partnership is
engaged in the conduct of a trade or business. Although limited partners are not
subject to SECA taxes on their distributive shares, unless they are receiving
payments for services performed for the partnership, still the inclusionary prin-
ciple can be said to apply to most self-employed persons.
As was noted above, the assumption underlying even an inclusive and expan-
sive notion of the SECA tax base is that certain categories of persons behave in
certain ways with respect to the business entity. Thus, limited partners are con-
sidered by definition to be passive investors and therefore their partnership
income cannot be considered to be equivalent to wages appropriate for SECA
taxation. Apart from limited partners, however, the presumption of current law
is that the income from a self-employed person's business activity is essentially
equivalent to wages, even though a certain portion of that income could well be
considered a return on that person's equity investment in the business.
The ABA proposal for LLCs and partnerships discussed above is an example
of this approach, because net income from all pass-through entities that are
treated like partnerships under the Code would be presumed to be subject to
SECA unless one of the safe harbors for return on capital were applicable,
resulting in exclusion of that part of total income from NESE.'4' The 1969
Treasury proposal concerning distributive shares of S corporation income for
shareholders is another, more extreme example of an inclusive approach to the
SECA tax base, in contrast to the current provisions for S corporation sharehold-
ers who do not perform services for the business.
'
4 See ABA Tax Section Letter, supra note 122.
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An alternative approach would be exclusionary; all income would presump-
tively be viewed as return on investment capital except for that which could be
clearly associated with the performance of services. This is essentially the ap-
proach of current law as applied to S corporation shareholders. At least one
commentator would extend this exclusionary approach to all types of flow-
through entities, thus greatly expanding the treatment of partner and LLC in-
come as return on capital:
[i]n general, a rebuttable presumption in favor of investor status for all owners
of interests in flowthrough entities would be established. Further, a "material
participation" standard would serve as a minimum threshold that, once met,
would trigger "reasonable compensation" rules for determination of what por-
tion of an individual's distributive share of the entity's income would be treated
as remuneration for services subject to the self-employment tax.'42
One major difference between these two approaches is the degree of adminis-
trative resources necessary to enforce proper imposition of the SECA tax under
each set of assumptions. For example, the current law's inclusionary approach is
enforced largely through organizational assumptions (S corporations are pre-
sumed to pay dividends, not earnings, and limited partners are presumed to
receive investment returns, not earnings) and otherwise places the onus on the
taxpayer to justify exclusion of any portion of his business income as return on
capital. The Service is not required to make a facts and circumstances analysis in
most SECA tax cases, except where there is a form over substance argument, as
in the cases discussed above in connection with business ventures not formally
organized as partnerships.
However, under the ABA proposal, despite its basic inclusionary approach, it
seems likely that heightened Service scrutiny of taxpayer arrangements would
be required. This is because the safe harbor tests for characterizing income as
return on capital could be overcome only by an examination of the individual
circumstances of each taxpayer's relationship to the pass-through entity, to de-
termine that a distribution is in fact earnings, rather than investment return. 43
The exclusionary approach would even more certainly increase the number of
facts and circumstances examinations necessary to enforce SECA tax imposition
and collection. For example, under the proposed rebuttable presumption test
described above, a positive finding by the Service of material participation in
LLC or partnership activities would be necessary to trigger SECA tax applica-
tion. Because the taxpayer has no incentive to report income as earnings subject
to SECA taxation, a higher burden than exists under current law would be
placed on the Service to collect roughly equivalent tax revenue. This incentive
imbalance is in contrast to the material participation rules applicable to partner-
ship losses, which place the burden on the taxpayer to prove his participation in
orde" to receive his desired tax result.
142FRirz, supra note 12, at 861.
143 1d.
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Perhaps more importantly, the proposals that have been advanced in the wake
of the LLC-SECA debate generally would weaken the principle of mandatory
universal coverage under Social Security, despite protests to the contrary, simply
by virtue of their underlying presumption of exclusion of most distributive shares
from the SECA base. While the presumptions could always be overcome through
increased administrative and examination efforts by the Service, such efforts are
unlikely to be mounted in light of the furor over the last several years over
abusive practices by the Service, that led to legislation greatly restricting its
examination and other powers. If the link between benefit accrual and SECA
taxation is maintained, any increase in the ability of self-employed persons
unilaterally to exempt income from SECA taxation would constitute a breach of
the fundamental mandatory tax system, and effectively allow self-employed
people to opt out of Social Security.
D. SECA Tax Payor Identification
A third way of looking at the universe of SECA tax problems is from the
perspective of identifying the proper person to pay SECA taxes. There are a
couple of issues under current law that can be highlighted in this connection.
First, there is the problem of identifying the self-employed person as distin-
guished from the employee-of determining who is the independent contractor,
and who is simply an employee whom the employer has characterized as an
independent contractor. Second, and related to the question of identifying inde-
pendent contractors, there is the issue of relying on common law or state law to
provide categories that indicate whether a self-employed person, or, alterna-
tively, a passive investor, exists.
The ABA approach for pass-through entities and their members does have the
advantage of eliminating the current tax statute's reliance on state law defini-
tions of limited and general partner in determining who should be considered to
be receiving wage equivalents taxable under SECA.'" Yet, to avoid a facts and
circumstances examination for each taxpayer, some form of categorization that
can be assumed to convey certain information about the nature of the person's
income (i.e., wages or non-wages) is necessary. Nonetheless, the state law defi-
nitions used, particularly in the case of partnerships, seems to create particular
problems as the nature of business organizations evolves. The original approach
in the 1970s amendments to Section 1402 perhaps relied too heavily on common
law concepts of distinctions between limited and general partners.
More generally, state law (both common law and state statute) possibly has
served as too much of an unreliable substitute for independent definitions in the
tax law, both in distinguishing independent contractors from employees, and in
separating passive investors from active participants in a business activity. Slough-
ing off the tax decision onto non-tax law can have unfortunate consequences in
many areas-but, as is often the case in developing tax statutes, using estab-
'"See ABA Tax Section Letter, supra note 122.
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lished definitions with which practitioners are already familiar frequently is the
only way to achieve a legislative end, and there is some hope that the law as
drafted will have something close to the desired effect. Nonetheless, once again,
as is the case in the problem areas discussed above, the glass slipper may simply
be the wrong size, and the painful results-lost revenue, weakening of the uni-
versal coverage principle, confusion among taxpayers and their advisors, and
increased compliance pressure on the Service-may be intolerable.
V. SOME MODEST SUGGESTIONS
A. In General
The principal source of difficulties in formulating and applying the self-em-
ployment tax appears to be the necessity to tie coverage of the self-employed
under Social Security to a tax system based on wages. Depending on the priority
placed on considerations such as administerability, the fairness of tax burdens
between the employed and the self-employed, the comprehensiveness of the tax
base, and the accuracy of recorded earnings for Social Security benefit purposes,
it may be impossible to develop a substitute that does not create as many prob-
lems as it solves. The range of possibilities, therefore, extends from the most
radical solution-eliminating SECA altogether and substituting a dual system of
revenue collection and benefit accrual-down to the most modest-which may
be represented by the Treasury Department's 1997 proposed regulations which
have yet to take effect.
B. Break the Payroll Tax Mold for the Self-Employed
The most far-reaching reform would be to abandon the payroll tax model
altogether for the self-employed, and separate the benefit accrual and revenue
collection functions. Since the taxes collected are not the basis for benefits, but
rather simply serve as a system of counters to keep track of earnings for benefit
eligibility and calculation purposes, there is no technical reason to keep those
functions combined. However, this kind of radical revision in the current struc-
ture would require creation of a Social Security revenue collection system oper-
ating as a part of the income tax system, as well as a new basis for calculating
earnings equivalents for self-employed people to serve as the basis for benefit
eligibility.
With respect to the revenue raising function, some form of income surtax to
collect a payroll tax equivalent amount from the self-employed, including all
members of pass-through entities regardless of their function in the business of
the entity, might be a logical candidate as a substitute for SECA. Such a surtax
could be applied to all taxpayers indicating on their regular tax returns expenses
and income from a trade or business or a partnership, on the grounds that all
such persons have self-employment income to one extent or another. The per-
centage of the tax could be adjusted to take account of those who have already
paid the non-HI portion of the payroll tax, up to the wage and contribution base
level, through other employment. Obviously, many details would have to be
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explored and filled out, but this type of approach may be worth considering, as it
would eliminate the need to determine actual activities of individual members of
partnerships or LLCs, for example, and would be focused solely on reported
income through the income tax reporting structure.
Benefit accrual under Social Security, and eligibility for Medicare, is prob-
ably a more difficult issue, given the need to determine quarters of covered
employment on which to base initial eligibility and, probably more importantly,
the levels of earnings below the wage and contribution base each year to plug
into the indexing and benefit formula calculations at the time the individual
becomes eligible for benefits. Nonetheless, some type of accounting for actual
earnings might be devised through a deeming approach, based on equating cer-
tain levels of the income surtax to certain levels of earnings for benefit purposes.
If the income surtax were to be collected directly through the income tax system,
regardless of what characterization the taxpayer chooses to apply to her activi-
ties, the burden might then be shifted to the taxpayer to insure that she gets
earnings record credit, at least for amounts that do actually represent earnings
rather than investment dividends.
C. Change Medicare Financing
Since it is unlikely that the payroll tax model will be rejected outright, an
alternative, possibly no less bold, would be to look outside the SECA tax struc-
ture completely for at least a partial resolution. As noted above, taxpayers had
few complaints about the structure and application of the SECA tax until the
wage base was eliminated for the Medicare portion of the tax. One partial
solution, therefore, might be to eliminate payroll tax financing for Medicare
altogether, and finance it completely out of income tax revenue. Since the ben-
efits under the system are not tied to the level of wages, and since virtually all
workers now qualify for Medicare coverage in any event, the link between
wages and the health insurance program seems more tenuous than ever.
This proposal would do nothing to clarify the proper imposition of SECA
taxes on participants in pass-through entities such as partnerships or LLCs, nor
would it eliminate controversies about separating earnings from other types of
income for SECA tax purposes. However, it would eliminate much of the nega-
tive reaction from those partners and members of LLCs most dramatically af-
fected by the elimination of the wage base in 1993, and presumably much of the
need for SECA tax reform, at least from their perspective.
Of course, general revenue financing of Medicare would constitute a major
break with the earned entitlement concept that has underwritten the program's
political support from its inception in the 1960s. Nonetheless, it may be time to
reconsider the necessity for precise links between earnings histories and Medi-
care eligibility in any event, given that Medicare coverage is virtually universal
today. A review of eligibility data might be in order, to determine the actual
number of persons who acquire Medicare eligibility solely through self-employ-
ment earnings, to assess the importance of the SECA Medicare tax system in
establishing eligibility for Medicare to start with.
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D. Change the Focus from Employment Category to Income Category
Of course, neither of these suggestions is likely to make much headway in the
legislative process, and they are suggested more as indicators of the magnitude
of the problem of revamping the SECA tax than in the hope that they might be
taken up as genuine legislative proposals. Yet the more limited proposals that
have been suggested, by the ABA and others, are much less likely to resolve the
issue of an ill-fitting statutory model that has created the SECA tax controversy
than abandoning the payroll tax concept either in the self-employment or the
Medicare context.
For example, the ABA proposals, which the AICPA has endorsed, focus (as
described above) on abandoning the presumption of current law that the
individual's formal relationship to the entity-i.e., limited or general partner-
can be used to identify whether income distributed from the entity to that person
constitutes investment return or wage income. Instead, the ABA suggests that
the law focus on identifying the type of income itself, and on exclusion of return
on capital from the reach of the SECA tax. Such a change in focus is probably
an improvement on current law, in that it reduces the reliance of the tax system
on categories and definitions established under non-tax law (limited versus gen-
eral partner), and zeroes in on the fundamental dilemma of the SECA tax-
identifying wages in a non-wage economic structure.
However, the ABA proposal places the burden of demonstrating which in-
come is from capital and which is from services squarely on the Service, requir-
ing not only regulations that would properly identify categories of income that
would be considered income from capital, but also heightened scrutiny of part-
nership and LLC member and entity tax returns to detect manipulation of indi-
vidual income flows and partnership activities that may be improperly
recharacterizing income to avoid SECA taxation. While the goal of the ABA
proposal is consistent with sound tax and Social Security benefit policy, it re-
tains the negative incentives of current law and could result in substantial rev-
enue loss to the Social Security system. Nonetheless, it represents an improve-
ment on the categorical approach of current law and even of the Treasury
Department's 1997 proposed regulations.
E. 1997 Proposed Regulations
The ABA-AICPA proposals were developed in reaction to the proposed regu-
lations issued by the Treasury Department in 1997, which Congress prevented
from going final by placing a moratorium on final promulgation in the summer
of 1997. These regulations, as discussed above, are not so much a departure
from the current law approach (as the ABA proposal would be) as a refinement
of the current law's reliance on non-tax categorical assumptions about the role
of limited and general partners. The Treasury Department's proposal, impor-
tantly, adds the possibility that one participant can possess different types of
interests in a pass-through entity, thus receiving both investment return and
wage-like income which should be treated differently for SECA tax purposes.
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The shortcomings of the Treasury Department's approach are essentially the
same as the problems inherent in current law. The continued reliance on state
law definitions in most circumstances, coupled with disregard of state law iden-
tification of limited partnerships in the case of service partnerships, traps these
proposals in a continued referential and categorical structure that may have no
relationship to the actual character of income to specific members of specific
pass-through entities.
VI. CONCLUSION: NEW SHOES FOR OLD
Most of the problems presented by the SECA tax are the consequences of the
dual functions served by the self-employment tax system-revenue collection
for the Social Security system and benefit accrual measurement under that sys-
tem. These roles are all a product of attempting to apply concepts developed in
connection with the payroll tax to a non-wage purely income tax to which those
concepts do not apply.
What is notable about the SECA tax is its peculiarly referential and highly
artificial nature. The SECA tax is perhaps more than normally referential, be-
cause its imposition depends on common law definitions of terms such as em-
ployee, partner, and partnership that are not stated in the Internal Revenue Code,
and thus are out of the control of Congress and the Service. It is particularly
artificial because it imposes on individuals working outside of the employer-
employee relationship a dual role of employer and employee, to fit those indi-
viduals into the framework established by the FICA tax, centering on employer-
provided wages and conditions of service controlled by someone other than the
worker.
The current conceptual framework of SECA requires the tax system and tax-
payers to create distinctions between wages and return on capital out of inher-
ently undifferentiated income, not for tax purposes, but rather for Social Security
benefit purposes. Moreover, the need to use net income from self employment as
a measure of wages means that self-employed persons have an inherent advan-
tage, in terms of manipulation of income to avoid SECA tax liability, over
employed persons.
Any revision to the SECA tax attempting to resolve the current issues con-
cerning LLCs and other pass-through entities must, for the sake of
administerability, involve application of categories and assumptions about the
nature of the relationship of persons in those categories to the business entity at
issue. The ABA proposals, focused on proper characterization of income, as
opposed to characterization of individual roles within the context of a pass-
through business entity, probably come as close as possible to maintaining the
current difficult link between the SECA tax system and the Social Security
benefit system, while still allowing for some leeway in interpretation, and main-
taining (more or less) the integrity of the concept of universal mandatory cover-
age.
Nonetheless, the preferable solution would be to break the link completely,
and abandon the attempt to characterize some income as wages primarily to
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realize the non-tax goal of benefit accrual under Social Security. Of course, the
questions raised by such a proposition about the use of the payroll tax model as
the revenue source for Social Security benefits can also, to some extent, be
raised about payroll taxes generally. That discussion, however, is for another
article. In the self-employment context, at least, it should be possible to con-
struct a deemed earnings credit system that fairly reflects a self-employed worker's
actual earnings experience, while imposing a completely separate income surtax
that would raise at least the approximately equivalent amount of revenue. While
such a dual system might be less precise than the FICA tax system attempts to
be in recording earnings and imposing taxes, it would probably be about as
accurate as the current SECA tax system, given the ability of self-employed
taxpayers to manipulate the net income measure.
The primary point is that the tax system generally relies on categories and
assumptions that enable us to make distinctions between types of income, and
apply different rates of taxation to those types of income. Thus, a separation of
benefit accrual from revenue-raising should be possible to accomplish, simply
by using the appropriate assumptions and categories in a way that reduces tax-
payer ability to manipulate definitions and income flows to eliminate their own
taxes and in effect create optional coverage under Social Security. A dual sys-
tem-one for benefit accrual, and the other for revenue collection-is consistent
with Social Security's underlying principles and would result in less distortion
of the tax system. Sometimes making a new shoe-or, in this case, two new
shoes-is easier than trying to make an old one fit.
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